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This paper examines capital controls in two ways. First, it assesses whether capital controls have an economic 
justification within the context of an economy’s and, in particular, its financial sector’s stage of development. It 
concludes that capital controls can be justified in countries with an immature financial sector and macroeconomic 
imbalances. Second, it presents survey of current capital controls in ASEAN+3. It identifies three avenues for 
making controls more efficient: (i) a tax on capital inflows, or alternatively, a Tobin tax; (ii) a replacement of 
extensive administrative controls with stricter prudential standards for financial institutions; and (iii) a special 
treatment for Asian currency unit (ACU) operations, implying selective capital flow liberalization. 
1.  Introduction
This paper examines capital controls in two ways. First, it assesses whether capital controls have an economic 
justification within the context of an economy’s and, in particular, its financial sector’s stage of development. This 
is the subject of Section II, which concludes that capital controls can be justified in countries with an immature 
financial sector and macroeconomic imbalances. In Section III we examine what guidelines are needed for 
efficient institutional arrangements and instruments for the control of capital flows. Theoretical considerations 
and the experience of countries outside the region lead to several lessons learned. Institutional arrangements 
are best avoided when there is an overlap of responsibilities across several institutions. Instruments should be 
simple, transparent, and flexible to cope with changes in capital flows.
A survey of current capital controls in ASEAN+3 is included as an appendix. The results, also arrived at in 
other contributions by the ASEAN+3 Research Group—notably Daiwa Institute of Research (2006)— show that 
the state of capital controls in the region is extremely diverse: it is ranging from nearly free capital flows to 
extensive and multilayered controls involving several institutions. This paper identifies three avenues for making 
controls more efficient: (i) a tax on capital inflows, or alternatively, a Tobin tax; (ii) a replacement of extensive 
administrative controls with stricter prudential standards for financial institutions; and (iii) a special treatment for 
Asian currency unit (ACU) operations, implying selective capital flow liberalization. Section IV summarizes the 
policy conclusions of this study.
2.	 Costs	and	benefits	of	capital	account	controls	
2.1	 Capital	account	convertibility—when	do	the	benefits	outweigh	the	costs?
The  tenet  that  international  trade—free  of  tariff  as  well  as  non-tariff  barriers—enhances  the  welfare  of  all 
countries involved lies at the very heart of international macroeconomics. Because international investment 
can be considered an inter-temporal form of international trade (Sachs 1981), there is an analogous case for 
enabling capital movements across national borders. Accordingly, capital will flow to where its contribution in 
increasing productivity (and thus its return) is highest, generating positive net welfare effects in both recipient and 
creditor countries. In addition, international financial capital movements allow for a degree of risk diversification 
unavailable in more restricted domestic markets.
This prescription requires that all parts of the economy are subjected to market principles. If parts of the goods 
markets or key service industries, in particular the financial market, are protected from competition, then no 
general conclusions for or against liberalization of capital flows make sense. By rule of thumb, the more market-
oriented an economy is, the stronger the case for free capital flows. This is why highly developed economies 
eliminated all or most capital controls during the last part of the 20th century. The case is less clear for developing 
or emerging economies. 
In addition to the argument cast in terms of allocational efficiency, there is the question of resilience to shocks. 
Experience shows that a financial sector must be mature and robust before exposing an economy to the potential 
stress of uncontrolled capital flows. 
The benign view that capital account liberalization improves the general welfare of all countries is supported 
neither by theoretical considerations nor by empirical evidence. It was a prominent feature of the new classical 
approach to macroeconomics that became dominant in the mid-1970s. Yet, after a prolonged period during which 
economists, attracted by the appeal of the “rational expectations revolution,” typically modelled financial markets 
as “information efficient,” the past 15 years or so have witnessed a gradual rediscovery of certain insights: that 
(i) decisions based on future variables not only imply risk, but uncertainty as well, (ii) decision-making in the 
face of uncertainty is not necessarily “rational,” and (iii) decisions are eventually based on information that is 
asymmetrically distributed and for the most part incomplete at best. Akerlof’s (1970) seminal paper on “the Market 
for Lemons” can be considered the impetus that brought these considerations back into mainstream economics. 
Since then, economists have applied Akerlof’s principles of “adverse selection” and “moral hazard” to a variety of 
economic issues, including how capital markets function (compare McKinnon [1991] and Greenwald and Stiglitz 
[1993]). The results imply a classic second-best situation: in the presence of distortions (for example, due to 
information asymmetries), removing another distortion (capital controls) need not improve the general welfare.
While the belief in the informational and, by implication, allocational efficiency of financial markets was increasingly 
questioned among at least part of the economics profession during the early 1990s, it remained firmly entrenched 
within international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United States (US) Treasury, 
which were at the forefront of advocating swift liberalization of capital accounts in developing economies (DeLong 
and Eichengreen 2001). Prominent observers—such as Jeffrey Sachs or Joseph Stiglitz—have long criticized 
the narrow interests of the so-called “Treasury–Wall Street complex,” which pushed with considerable zeal for 
opening capital markets of emerging economies, promising significantly higher returns than those from markets 
in industrialized countries at the time.
The Asian financial crisis, followed by banking and financial crises in Russia and Latin America, changed the 
general attitude among economic advisers quite drastically. With the benefit of hindsight, the broad majority of 
economists now agrees that many emerging economies that suffered from these crises would have been much 
less vulnerable had a more cautious approach to capital account liberalization been taken. Today, policy advice 
reflects that change. For the People’s Republic of China (PRC), for instance, the IMF—unlike the US Treasury—
argues for gradual capital account liberalization while strengthening the financial system and moving toward a 
more flexible exchange rate (Prasad, Rumbaugh, and Wang 2005). Capital flow liberalization is still deemed 
beneficial in the longer run. However, the crises in the late 1990s demonstrated that successful development is 
contingent on a broader set of institutional and macroeconomic circumstances that are a precondition to reaping 
the benefits of liberalization.
Indeed, the very history of capital controls in the industrialized countries plainly underscores this view. Nowhere 
was capital account liberalization achieved overnight. In the aftermath of the Bretton Woods era, which was 
grounded on the restriction of capital movements, controls were typically dismantled gradually, and only then 
in line with institutional developments that guaranteed capital account mobility would not generate destabilizing 
effects. In a number of countries in today’s European Monetary Union (EMU), forms of capital flow management 
were in place well into the 1990s—one chief rationale for the cautious removal of capital controls was always that 
financial markets were not sufficiently developed to handle full capital account convertibility. Moreover, under the 
European Monetary System (EMS), which practically reintroduced fixed-exchange rates in much of Europe only 
6 years after the end of Bretton Woods, preserving capital controls was a necessary prerequisite for maintaining 
monetary policy options. It is not surprising, therefore, that Germany, whose deutschmark quickly took on the 
role of anchor currency within the EMS, was the one country which could afford to move to capital account 
convertibility earlier, as it was basically free from the requirement to stabilize its exchange rate.1
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. After a brief clarification of terms and definitions, we analyze 
the benefits and costs of capital account liberalization from a theoretical and empirical point of view. We then ask 
whether there are safeguards that can be employed in order to avoid the kind of circumstances that precipitate 
a financial crisis—thus allowing the potential benefits of increased capital mobility while minimizing exposure to 
potential drawbacks. As the answer is “no,” we consider the implications for Southeast Asia’s emerging economies 
faced with the delicate task of sequencing reforms and liberalization. While specific advice inevitably varies for 
each country (Eichengreen 2005), numerous key issues can be identified and are discussed.
1  For a comprehensive documentation of the debate in Europe leading to the creation of a common financial market with virtually free 
capital movement, see European Commission (1988). It is worth mentioning that a number of recent contributions deny the contingency 
of increasing financial integration on capital account convertibility. Most prominently, Prasad, Rogoff, et al. (2003) have demonstrated 
that for emerging economies, examples of both “financial integration without capital account liberalization” (the PRC) and “liberalization 
without integration” (Turkey) have occurred, begging the question of the intuitive chronology of events. Again, the evolution of economic 
and financial integration within the European Union certainly supports this view.
2.1.1	 What	are	capital	controls?
Conventional capital controls
Simply put, any measure that limits or redirects capital account transactions is a capital control (Neely 1999). 
By this definition, all policies influencing the volume, composition, or allocation of cross-border private capital 
flows that result differently from completely liberalized financial markets can be classified as ��p���� ����r���. 
However, because limitations on foreign currency transactions also affect capital mobility, ex�h��ge ����r��� 
(i.e., controls regulating the rights of residents to hold foreign currency and the rights of non-residents to hold 
domestic currency deposits) are alongside capital controls as measures that restrain capital account transactions 
(Epstein, Grabel, and Jomo 2004). Thus, exchange controls are included in our detailed description of capital 
controls within ASEAN+3 (Appendix).
Within this broad definition, there are a number of distinctions between forms of capital controls. The most 
notable and relevant are between controls on capital ��fl�w� and �u�fl�w�, as well as between tax-based and 
quantitative controls.2 Restrictions on capital outflows were the preferred policy tool during the first period of 
modern capital controls (World War I and the Great Depression of the 1930s). At the time, domestic savings were 
expected to create additional policy scope for reflating economies while limiting the risk of capital flight (Neely 
1999). In the post-Bretton Woods era, restrictions on capital outflows continued to be used, most notably by 
developing countries hit by the debt crisis of the 1980s, and more recently by the Malaysian government, which 
imposed restrictions on capital outflows to buy time for alternative macroeconomic policy measures during the 
Asian crisis. 
In contrast, restrictions on capital ��fl�w� are designed to limit the overall volume of capital pouring into a country, 
or to influence the composition of these flows. Major reasons include domestic vulnerability to reversals of 
flows, inflationary pressures and loss of monetary control, and the fear of excessive foreign influence through 
ownership of domestic assets (real estate, banks, other corporations, or raw materials, for example). The most 
recent and widely-cited example of a policy designed to impact capital inflows is the case of Chile in the 1990s—
at the same time an example of a tax-based control. The government introduced an unremunerated reserve 
requirement for foreign capital entering the country that effectively taxed capital inflows—the relative burden 
decreasing the longer the capital remained in the country.3 A quantitative control, in contrast, involves measures 
such as restrictions or quotas, license requirements, or even an outright ban of a certain type of investment (for 
example, portfolio or property investments) for a certain type of investor—foreign investors in the case of inflow 
restrictions, domestic investors in the case of outflow restrictions.
Financial sector regulations as capital controls
While the cases mentioned above are examples of “traditional” capital controls, it is important to stress that various 
forms of financial sector regulation can equally act as restrictions on certain cross-border capital movements. 
For instance, a bank can be subject to limits on the ratio of foreign currency liabilities to equity. While this type 
of regulation clearly impacts the volume and/or composition of foreign capital flows, it is not classified as a 
capital control. If it were, none of today’s developed economies could be said to operate under a completely 
liberalized capital account regime. Financial sector regulation is an integral part of financial market legislation in 
the industrialized world, and quite rightly so.
Consequently, it is essential to keep a broader perspective when assessing the role of restrictions on international 
capital movements. Epstein, Grabel, and Jomo (2004) suggest discussing the entire complex of what they term 
“capital management techniques,” incorporating issues of “prudential financial regulation” alongside outright 
capital control measures. They not only argue that financial regulation can assume functions typically attributed 
to capital controls, but also provide evidence suggesting that there can be substantial synergies between financial 
regulation and forms of capital control. Therefore, we recommend in Section 3 considering the substitution of 
2  Bird and Rajan (2000) offer a discussion and systematic classification of different restraints to capital movements.  Bird and Rajan (2000) offer a discussion and systematic classification of different restraints to capital movements.
3  The problems of a clear-cut distinction are becoming evident here. �ne might as well argue with some right that the Chilean measure The problems of a clear-cut distinction are becoming evident here. �ne might as well argue with some right that the Chilean measure 
constitutes an outflow restriction, as the implicit tax burden depends on the point in time at which the investor decides to withdraw the 
capital.
administrative controls, which are less transparent and more discriminatory through prudential regulation of 
foreign exchange exposure.
2.1.2	 The	case	for	capital	account	liberalization
In economic theory, the case for liberalized financial markets stands on firm ground. In fact, it is rather simple 
to compose a model that demonstrates how free cross-border capital movements improve economic welfare in 
the countries involved. Interest rate differentials between countries (or entire regions) reflect the relative scarcity 
of capital. Liberalizing capital accounts then generates capital movements from relatively capital abundant to 
relatively capital scarce areas. In an analogy to international trade in goods and services, such movements can 
be thought of as extending the possibility frontier of importers and exporters of capital, respectively. In capital 
importing countries, an investor’s access to credit is no longer constrained by domestic savings. Creditors, 
in turn, are able to reap higher returns on financial assets than they would in their domestic markets. Capital 
movements thus increase the effectiveness of international resource allocation.4 Eventually, complete capital flow 
liberalization between global financial markets would result in equal (risk-adjusted) rates of return everywhere, 
which, in terms of economic theory, characterizes a situation of perfect allocation efficiency.
This issue relating to the efficient allocation of resources also involves an inter-temporal component. Allowing 
capital to flow freely between countries is a means of creating opportunities for portfolio diversification and 
international risk sharing. As national economies are exposed to economic shocks of very different kinds and 
often to greatly varying  degrees,  international  diversification  of portfolios  can clearly  improve  the ability  to 
weather idiosyncratic shocks. Apparently, this mechanism is of particular importance to smaller countries, where 
production is typically less diversified and thus more vulnerable to industry-specific disruptions.
In short, pure economic theory offers a hardly surprising result with regard to the desirability of capital account 
openness. The reasons why increased financial intermediation is considered beneficial to domestic markets 
also hold at the international level. Indeed, capital allocation, and especially risk diversification, can be expected 
to work better the more integrated the financial markets in question. At the same time, emerging economies 
with relatively less developed domestic capital markets should profit in particular, since integration into a larger 
international market can serve to alleviate existing financial constraints.
While this covers general theoretical implications, a differentiation between different types of capital flows is 
required for a more detailed juxtaposition of the costs and benefits of capital account convertibility. Here, a 
commonly-used distinction is adequate (for example, Williamson 1999), which groups capital flows into
•	 foreign direct investment (FDI)
•	 portfolio investments
•	 long-term loans, and
•	 short-term loans.5
A look at the specific characteristics of each of these categories of capital flows, viewed with the events of the 
Asian crisis in mind, underscores the need for an individual assessment of each. Differences exist in the degree 
of volatility (FDI and long-term loans are generally regarded as rather stable, while portfolio investments and 
short-term loans can show substantial volatility), as well as the denomination of loans (domestic or foreign 
currency). These distinctions are crucial in the arguments developed in section 2.1.3.
Focusing for a moment on FDI, it is notable that additional benefits have been attributed to this form of capital 
flows when the recipient is a developing or emerging economy (see World Bank [1995]). Enhanced access to 
foreign technology is one potential FDI contribution that goes beyond the allocational effects described above. A 
second contribution associated with FDI is the acquisition of new skills by domestic employees of international 
corporations, which can occur directly (through training) or indirectly (through exposure to management and work 
processes as well as foreign co-workers. Both kinds of benefits can be grouped under spillover effects, which play 
4  In principal, this is the bottom line of standard textbooks addressing international finance, e.g., �bstfeld and Rogoff (1996). In principal, this is the bottom line of standard textbooks addressing international finance, e.g., �bstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
5  While the threshold separating short- from long-term loans is essentially arbitrary, the 5-year maturity employed in Williamson (1999) While the threshold separating short- from long-term loans is essentially arbitrary, the 5-year maturity employed in Williamson (1999) 
seems appropriate.
a prominent role in the literature on endogenous technological progress. As a matter of fact, favourable effects 
of increasing FDI are a regularly obtained result of cross-country growth regressions (for example, Borensztein, 
De Gregorio, and Lee, 1995; and Bradstetter, 2000).
Unfortunately, the empirical literature is more ambiguous on the question of positive growth effects from capital 
account liberalization.6 Some researchers (for example, Quinn, 1996) have reported a statistically significant 
positive impact of a measure of capital account liberalization on growth in cross-country studies, while others (for 
example, Rodrik, 1998) find no such connection. In their study, Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2001) seek 
to explain this discrepancy and provide evidence that results pointing to a positive connection are not sufficiently 
robust, and that favourable effects of capital account liberalization are contingent on preconditions that must be 
fulfilled in the countries in question.7
It is rather safe to say that this view is now generally shared by most economists. The benefits of liberalizing the 
capital account are recognized, and despite the problems that free cross-border capital flows entail (discussed in 
the following subsection), there is little doubt that open capital accounts are desirable in the longer run. Capital 
controls may still exist—the PRC’s example above suggests that they might yet work to a certain extent—but 
essentially, as one observer put it, their time is past (Dornbusch 1998). �ver the past three decades, the world 
has become ever more integrated through the internalization of trade in goods and services, and this very 
development of liberalized and increasingly interdependent current accounts has contributed to a situation where 
capital controls are becoming less and less practicable.
From another perspective, the main argument in favour of capital account liberalization over time is that it serves 
to remove the specific distortions associated with maintaining capital controls. For one thing, the state has to 
devote resources to secure the effectiveness of established capital controls. At the same time, however, resources 
will also be invested by the private sector in an inevitable attempt to circumvent those very controls. The resulting 
overall costs (administrative costs and costs of corruption in evading controls) constitute an obvious dead-weight 
loss to society. And this loss can be considerable, given the fact that simple capital controls are easily avoided 
by using a number of well-known loopholes8—authorities must take substantial efforts to ensure capital controls 
are in fact effective. Costs to the private sector in attempting to circumvent the controls necessarily rise as well. 
In a related line of argument, observers like Dornbusch and Edwards (1991, with respect to Latin America) or 
Krugman (1998, with a focus on the Asian crisis) point to the fact that capital controls can be particularly harmful 
if they lead to (or are used to defend) poor or inconsistent macroeconomic policies. �ther things equal, capital 
mobility undoubtedly contributes to the clear preference to create external market discipline for macroeconomic 
policymakers.
While this argument may be accurate, all other things are of course not equal. Above all, financial markets are 
not perfect. If they were, one would have expected the shortcomings in Asia’s crisis-affected countries to be 
recognized and the associated risks incorporated into assessments bef�reh��d, rather than “discovering” them 
�f�er the crisis struck. Without a doubt, past crises demonstrate where capital account convertibility can hurt far 
more than help.
6  Eichengreen (2001) offers a survey of the empirical literature on the link between capital account convertibility and economic Eichengreen  (2001)  offers  a  survey  of  the  empirical  literature  on  the  link  between  capital  account  convertibility  and  economic 
performance.
7  In Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001), the absence of major macroeconomic imbalances (proxied by a black market premium) In Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001), the absence of major macroeconomic imbalances (proxied by a black market premium) 
is found to be a prerequisite for benefits from opening the capital account. Against the background of the Southeast Asian crisis, other 
preconditions spring to mind and will be discussed in due course.
8  The most widely practiced evasion tactics involve using “leads” and “lags” in payments for traded goods (cf. Einzig, 1968) and use of The most widely practiced evasion tactics involve using “leads” and “lags” in payments for traded goods (cf. Einzig, 1968) and use of 
financial derivatives (cf. Garber, 1998).
Box	1:	Do	capital	controls	in	East	Asia	preclude	global	readjustment?
Current global payments imbalances—centered on the burgeoning US current account deficit—
are a central feature of today’s world economy. While interpretations differ to some degree, 
many observers agree that a deliberate correction should be attempted, the sooner the better, 
to avoid turmoil in financial markets that could trigger a recession in the US specifically, and on 
a global scale as a result.1 Alongside recent developments in commodity markets, a significant 
counterpart to the US deficit can be found in the surpluses recorded by the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC). At this point, however, a bilateral perspective is not appropriate. Rather, the 
PRC acts as a sort of trade hub channeling goods from all over the East Asian region to the US, 
and thereby runs current account deficits with its neighbors. According to this diagnosis, all East 
Asia bears responsibility to make major adjustments to exchange rate regimes to bring about 
an appreciation of domestic currencies against the US dollar and to increase absorption levels 
(see also Eichengreen, 2006).
In this context, existing capital controls have come under fire, whether in the PRC or in other 
economies  in  the  region. The  argument  runs  as  follows:  East Asian  countries  continue  to 
meddle in foreign exchange markets to maintain undervalued domestic currencies and thus an 
unfair competitive edge. It is precisely for this reason that they have upheld or reinstated capital 
controls to varying degrees. �nce the controls are scrapped, foreign exchange markets will 
have the leeway to move exchange rates in accordance with economic fundamentals—i.e. an 
appreciation of domestic currencies —and thus create a benign solution to global imbalances.2 
However, there are questions whether the supposed link between capital controls and global 
readjustment through exchange rate flexibility holds. First, does East Asia truly need flexible 
exchange rates? Second, will countries concerned be obliged to abolish capital controls to 
enable exchange rate regime reform? While a detailed discussion of the costs and benefits 
of either fixed or flexible exchange rates lies beyond the scope of this paper, in the context of 
global readjustment the answer to the first question is simply that while appreciation against 
the dollar seems to be a condition ���e qu� ���, freely floating exchange rates clearly are not. 
Substantial realignment, while keeping exchange rates generally fixed, represents a perfectly 
viable alternative. 
As for the second question, it is hard to see why capital markets should have to be fully liberalized 
pr��r to floating the exchange rate. Indeed, this is the theme of a number of authors who favor 
flexible exchange rates over discrete readjustments for reasons related to internal equilibrium 
of the economies concerned.3 Even without full capital account convertibility, a large volume 
of basically unrestricted trade transactions can ensure a sufficiently deep foreign exchange 
market. Indeed, allowing business to participate in foreign exchange transactions can offer 
firms the opportunity to develop hedging techniques in an environment sheltered by existing 
capital controls. In this way, maintaining capital controls may alleviate the “fear of floating” in line 
with the sequencing considerations elaborated above. �verall, full capital account liberalization 
is neither a necessary precondition for flexible exchange rates, nor is it needed to ensure a 
smooth correction of the current global imbalances. Quite the contrary, maintaining capital 
controls should facilitate the region’s further integration into the world economy.
1   Recent analyses such as Bergsten and Williamson (2004) as well as Mann (2004) highlighted the increasing 
potential for crisis. An exception to this commonly-shared view is Cooper (2005).
2.1.3	 The	drawbacks	of	capital	account	liberalization
In models of real trade, distortions and their implications for liberalizing capital movements have long been 
analyzed and interpreted in accordance with the theory of second best. To name but two examples, Brecher and 
Diaz-Alejandro (1977) have shown that in a situation where import-competing industries are protected (by tariff 
or non-tariff barriers), foreign capital inflows will be misallocated, causing comparative welfare losses. Similarly, 
rigid real wages can lead additional resources to be predominantly channelled into capital-intensive industries, 
with equally negative allocational effects (Brecher 1983, Brecher and Bhagwati 1991). In both cases, capital 
account liberalization serves to reinforce negative results that are already present in a situation without capital 
account convertibility. When this occurs, economic theory recommends that the initial distortions be eliminated 
first in order to then realize the benefits of removing the one under consideration, i.e., restrictions on capital 
movements.
The implications of distortions on financial markets remain less clearly understood than real trade distortions, 
which may simply be due to the difficulty in analyzing the impact of informational asymmetries in financial markets 
on real economic activity. As argued above, even though the belief in the information efficiency of financial markets 
began to crumble since the late 1980s, a significant part of the economics profession apparently deemed the 
destabilizing effects of this particular form of distortion insufficient to constitute a powerful counter-argument to 
increased capital account liberalization. 
The Mexican peso crisis of 1994–95 might have served as a wakeup call, but it took the Asian financial crisis 
and the severe recessions that followed—in the world’s most dynamic and fastest-growing economic region—to 
finally bring the matter of international financial market instability to the top of the agenda. To be sure, a variety 
of rational economic explanations for the crisis were rapidly produced, typically passing the buck to the crisis 
countries themselves. Most observers highlighted inadequate financial supervision of domestic borrowers as 
the reason for increased vulnerability to short-term capital flow reversals and/or currency devaluation. �thers 
criticized a lack of transparency that made it difficult for foreign creditors to assess the actual risks involved in 
lending to crisis-affected countries. Some observers, equipped with the benefit of hindsight, questioned the 
strength of macroeconomic fundamentals. Finally, some agreed with Krugman, who focused on the role explicit 
and implicit government guarantees played in inducing excessive risk-taking and creating asset bubbles.
However, while all of these accounts certainly highlight important aspects of the crisis, none explain exactly why 
the crisis hit the specific countries it did, and not other economies in the region.9 As Williamson (1999) points 
out, at the time bank regulation was notoriously bad in several non-crisis countries, probably better on average 
in crisis-affected economies and outstanding in one of them, Hong Kong, China. Almost the same can be said 
about lack of transparency and implicit guarantees, which were at least as common in non-crisis countries as 
elsewhere. Finally, as for the strength of macroeconomic fundamentals, a close look reveals that the crisis-
affected economies did not display any larger imbalances on average than non-crisis economies. There is only 
one criterion that successfully discriminates between the two groups: crisis-affected economies had liberalized 
capital accounts, while non-crisis countries did not.
The implications of this observation for a cost-benefit analysis of capital account liberalization are forceful. If 
liberalizing international capital movements increases the danger of becoming entangled in a severe financial 
crisis, then the costs in terms of growth lost for an emerging economy are likely to dwarf the potential benefits 
realized by economies with open capital accounts. Williamson (1999) calculates that a country borrowing 1% of 
GNP abroad to finance projects with an annual rate-of-return of 10% in excess of its borrowing costs adds a mere 
0.1% to its growth rate. Even at an extraordinary 5% of GNP in foreign borrowing, the additional growth effect 
is just half a percentage point.10 In light of the massive negative growth rates recorded by Asia’s crisis-affected 
economies in 1998, this does not stand out as a particularly good bargain.11
9  While Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; and Thailand recorded negative GDP growth in 1998, Bangladesh; While Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; and Thailand recorded negative GDP growth in 1998, Bangladesh; 
PRC; India; Pakistan; Sri Lanka; and Taipei,China all had positive growth. For details see Steinherr and Peree (1999).
10  The effect might be bigger if spillover effects play a role, e.g., if the FDI share is very high.
11 The actual scope of the extremely severe recessions in South-East Asia was even bigger than the loss of GDP suggests, since – as The actual scope of the extremely severe recessions in South-East Asia was even bigger than the loss of GDP suggests, since – as 
several observers have noted – the negative repercussions fell disproportionally onto the urban poor, which created particular social 
problems within the countries affected by the crisis.
Indeed, there are now few economists who would deny that “market failures arising from asymmetric information, 
incompleteness of contingent markets, and bounded rationality (not to mention irrationality) are endemic to 
financial markets.”12 Moreover, what holds for financial markets in general is even more likely to be relevant to 
international financial flows—in addition to the informational deficiencies present in domestic financial markets, 
cross-border  capital  flows  involve  the  bridging  of  cultural  distances  between  market  participants  (Arteta, 
Eichengreen, and Wyplosz 2001). Yet, there remains the view in the economics profession that solving the 
main problems identified after the Asian crisis will be sufficient to deal with financial market imperfections and in 
ensuring capital account convertibility is beneficial. However, there is good reason to doubt this view. Dani Rodrik 
(1998) clearly made the point with reference to economic historian Charles Kindleberger, who 
claims that financial crises have appeared at roughly ten-year intervals for the last 400 years 
[…]. As he puts it “the record shows displacement, euphoria, distress, panic and crisis occurring 
decade after decade, century after century…” Boom-and-bust cycles are hardly a side show 
or a minor blemish in international capital flows; they are the main story.13 
According to Rodrik, whose view is shared by a number of prominent economists such as Jeffrey Sachs or Joseph 
Stiglitz, enforcing prudential financial regulation and monitoring macroeconomic fundamentals will not preclude 
future financial crises—with potentially large negative repercussions for economic growth in the economies 
affected. He suggests the need to be
wary about statements of the form “we can make free capital flows safe for the world if we 
do X at the same time”, where X is the currently fashionable antidote to crisis. Today’s X is 
“strengthening the domestic financial system and improving prudential standards”. Tomorrow’s 
is anybody’s guess.14 
This is not to say that tackling problems that have been identified is not desirable. But it does say that even this 
may not shield emerging and developing countries with unrestricted capital account convertibility from financial 
crises.15 Capital management techniques are therefore a required tool for dealing with the side effects of free 
international capital movements. As argued above, those techniques include measures for improved financial 
sector regulation, but also types of more direct capital control. In light of the high domestic savings rates in 
many ASEAN countries, providing necessary funds for investment—a standard argument for capital account 
liberalization—is less critical.16 The focus should be on encouraging FDI and long-term loans, while discouraging 
volatile short-term capital flows that wreaked so much havoc during the 1997/98 crisis.
Before these matters are discussed in more detail in the sections below, we examine the issue of monetary 
policy independence under capital mobility and different exchange rate regimes (Box 2).
12 Rodrik (1998), p. 4. Rodrik (1998), p. 4.
13 ibid., p. 2. ibid., p. 2.
14 ibid., p. 6. ibid., p. 6.
15 As a matter of fact, it was the perception by market participants of strong macroeconomic fundamentals in Asia’s “tiger economies” in As a matter of fact, it was the perception by market participants of strong macroeconomic fundamentals in Asia’s “tiger economies” in 
the first place that left the region virtually flooded with foreign capital during the early- to mid-1990s.
16 This is one difference between ASEAN and Eastern Europe, cf., Eichengreen and Choudhry (2005). This is one difference between ASEAN and Eastern Europe, cf., Eichengreen and Choudhry (2005).0
Box	2:	Impossible	Trinity	or	Impossible	Duality?
Mundell’s “Impossible Trinity” of international macroeconomics suggests that of three “goods”—
stable exchange rates, independent monetary policy, and capital mobility—only two can be 
obtained by a country at any given time. Under the Bretton Woods regime established after 
WWII, stable exchange rates and relative independence of monetary authorities (given the 
dominant role of US monetary policy) were bought at the price of strict capital controls. In a 
similar way, the PRC today makes use of capital controls to maintain its quasi-fixed exchange 
rate while retaining a degree of maneuverability for its central bank. The countries forming the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) went the other way. Capital mobility and stable exchange 
rates also mean that the member states have to do without individual monetary policies.1 Finally, 
capital mobility and independent monetary policy, the combination chosen by countries such as 
the US, Japan, United Kingdom, or for that matter the euro area as a whole, can be achieved 
by letting the currency’s exchange rate fluctuate.
In this analysis, the benefits of moving to full capital mobility must be weighed against the costs 
of giving up either fixed-exchange rates or monetary policy independence. With most ASEAN 
countries now officially operate under floating-exchange rate regimes—but continue to intervene 
in foreign exchange markets to maintain a competitive exchange rate—it is consequently an 
independent monetary policy that drops out. Indeed, a goal of the Malaysian government when 
it imposed capital outflow controls in September 1998 was to buy time and make use of regained 
maneuverability in monetary policy while coping with the ongoing financial crisis. Thus, the 
question seems to be whether giving up independent monetary policy for the sake of free capital 
movements can be considered a good bargain for ASEAN members. The view taken in this 
paper, however, is that true monetary policy independence is essentially out of the question for 
developing and emerging economies. 
To arrive at this conclusion, we start by considering the fact that to maintain a stable exchange 
rate that deviates from what financial markets deem “appropriate,” central banks compromise 
their  independence  (Shambaugh  2004).  Problems  occur  whenever  operations  required  to 
maintain the currency peg collide with domestic economic stabilization targets requiring the 
use of monetary policy tools—notably when setting short-term money market interest rates. 
Following this line, countries may not be able to exert monetary policy independence whenever 
large foreign exchange market intervention is required to maintain a desired exchange rate, 
regardless of the degree of capital mobility.
The second, more serious challenge to the impossible trinity hypothesis comes from those 
observers  who  have  argued  that  monetary  policy  independence  is  a  fiction  in  a  world  of 
global capital account liberalization, irrespective of the adopted exchange rate regime (e.g., 
Flassbeck 2001). In a recent ECB working paper, Fratzscher (2002) finds no evidence that the 
move to a more flexible currency regime is systematically linked to increased monetary policy 
independence. Indeed, the move from quasi-fixed to floating regimes in East Asia after 1998 
has typically been accompanied by an increased depe�de��e on US monetary policy.
2.2	 	Providing	information,	preventing	crises
In the context of a fully liberalized capital account, free access to pertinent information is key if crises are to 
be avoided. The question is clear: is there an easy and unambiguous way for the private sector to assess the 
sustainability of a country’s foreign debt position? If not, leaving the foreign exchange market to its own devices 
might be nothing short of an invitation to balance-of-payments crises. This section begins by theoretically defining 
some possible indicators of sustainability. It then tests those indicators using empirical evidence from the most 
important regional episode—the 1997/98 Asian currency crisis. Finally, we offer a brief account on how financial 
innovation tends to complicate crisis prevention.
2.2.1	 Warning	signals	for	currency	crises?
Possible benchmarks
There has been a considerable amount of literature attempting to discern the underlying factors of currency 
crises. �f course, the most direct approach to explaining an abrupt devaluation of the domestic currency might 
focus on the identification of the actual degree of overvaluation prior to crisis-like developments. Unfortunately, 
three issues muddle this logic when applied to real-world data. First, a currency’s position at a given point in time 
must be related to some sort of equilibrium state. Establishing an adequate equilibrium concept however, has 
proved very difficult, leaving analysts more or less confined to intuitive guesswork. Second, as demonstrated by 
Chinn (1998) for the Asian crisis, a great variety of existing exchange rate models lead to differing and sometimes 
conflicting results.17 And finally, in the context of investment decision-making, there is no guarantee that either 
public or private protagonists will consider the same criteria based on actual fundamentals. �verall, measures of 
exchange rate valuation do not seem to be reliable indicators for balance-of-payments problems.
As misalignment itself may not be easy to detect, research has focused on more indirect symptoms related to an 
overvalued domestic exchange rate. �ne of these symptoms, a persistent and worsening current account deficit, 
has been at the forefront of current discussions on the state of the global economy.18 A number of analysts have 
argued that current account deficits exceeding about 5% of GDP are not sustainable over the medium term and 
therefore increase the risk of full-blown financial and currency crises.19 Nevertheless, empirical support for this 
assumption is rather thin. Thus, the majority of reversals are not brought about by a rapid depreciation of the 
domestic currency, which might be characterized as a currency crisis. Rather, the improvement of the current 
account balance typically follows a smooth adjustment process.20 Furthermore, while current account deficits 
do tend to reverse at around 5% of GDP �� �ver�ge, there are big differences in the actual value of the turning 
points. These complexities are not surprising as the current account reflects many differing developments in the 
domestic economy, not all of which call for a lower exchange-rate.21 
Considering these difficulties, current account deficits may represent a necessary condition for currency crises 
yet they may by no means be sufficient. The same logic applies to other measures of debt, such as the ratio 
of the debt service to the volume of exports of goods and services or the ratio of total external debt to either 
exports or GDP. The modest performance of indicators of aggregate external debt has led analysts to take a 
closer look at the characteristics of the liabilities incurred. An initial approach in this vein is the Lawson-doctrine, 
17 According to the sticky price monetary model used by Chinn, only Singapore’s currency was significantly overvalued. The Korean won According to the sticky price monetary model used by Chinn, only Singapore’s currency was significantly overvalued. The Korean won 
and the Philippine peso showed clear signs of undervaluation. For a comparison of different measures of exchange-rate misalignments 
in the context of the Asian crisis, see Furman and Stiglitz (1998, pp. 36–39).
18  It is ironic that the US is causing the worries, not emerging economies.
19 For example, Freund (2000, p.18) states that “a typical adjustment occurs after the current account deficit has grown for about four For example, Freund (2000, p.18) states that “a typical adjustment occurs after the current account deficit has grown for about four 
years and reaches about 5% of GDP.”
20 Consequently, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (1998, p.36) conclude that “a comparison of currency crashes and current account reversals Consequently, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (1998, p.36) conclude that “a comparison of currency crashes and current account reversals 
shows that these are, in general, distinct events.”
21 Thus, Reisen (1998, p.19) remarks: “the size of the current account deficit does not give rise to normative judgements; a deficit worth Thus, Reisen (1998, p.19) remarks: “the size of the current account deficit does not give rise to normative judgements; a deficit worth 
3% of GDP may be ‘excessive’ in one country, while a deficit worth 12% of GDP may be justified for another country.”
which discriminates between private and public sector debt.22 While the former does not lead to balance of 
payments problems, the latter is considered more problematic. �f course, the assumption that there is such a 
phenomenon as an inherent stability of the private sector, whereas government expenditure is per se connected 
with irresponsible profligacy, merits some doubt at least.23 A more satisfying rationale for fiscal indicators has 
been offered by the first generation models of currency crises in the tradition of the seminal articles by Krugman 
(1979) and Flood and Garber (1984). According to this approach, persistent and uncontrollable public deficits call 
for monetary alimentation. At some point, the increase in the domestic money supply will compromise the central 
bank’s ability to maintain the official exchange rate parity. 
Another way to discriminate between different categories of capital flows is not to look at the way it is being 
used—by the public or the private sector—but rather at the way it is being acquired. The first part of this paper 
detailed the logic motivating this approach: Some asset classes, such as FDI and portfolio investments with 
longer maturities, seem more suitable to financial market stability than others, such as the various forms of short-
term capital. Moreover, this view is in accord with the fact that crises basically constitute a liquidity problem as 
opposed to a solvency issue. In the short run however, even the withdrawal of considerable amounts of short-
term capital can be countered by central bank intervention. Therefore, it is a higher ratio of short-term liabilities 
to foreign exchange reserves that could act as warning signal for currency crises.
Empirical performance
As demonstrated above, there are a number of possible indicators that can be constructed for currency crises, 
even if theoretical drawbacks must be conceded in most cases. The real test comes when theory is matched with 
empirical data. Table 1 offers a rough overview. Data include actual values for the potential indicators in 1996, 





















Indonesia 1.0 -2.9 55.0 214.0 31.0 144.9
Korea,	Rep.	of 0.3 -4.4 31.6 126.4 7.6 316.5
Malaysia 1.1 -4.4 38.4 40.8 6.6 46.6
Philippines 0.3 -4.6 48.1 105.9 15.5 69.0
Thailand 2.7 -7.9 49.9 146.2 12.1 103.0
Bangladesh -4.4 -2.4 37.6 246.0 9.4 33.7
China,	People’s	Rep.	of -1.4 0.9 14.2 68.0 6.0 13.4
India -5.5 -1.8 27.6 215.4 24.2 23.0
Pakistan -7.8 -7.2 53.9 279.9 25.3 266.0
Sri	Lanka -9.4 -5.2 68.6 168.2 15.3 96.1
Source:	IMF	Article	IV	documentation.	
Exports	are	exports	of	goods	and	services,	exports	for	Korea	and	Malaysia	include	goods	only.
We focus on the most affected countries—Indonesia, Republic of Korea (Korea), Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand. In addition, a control group of countries that eluded the crisis is presented: Bangladesh, PRC, India, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. This control group serves two purposes. First, we expect a clearer difference between 
necessary and sufficient conditions. And second, as with the current account balance, the definition of precise 
22 The Lawson-doctrine is epitomized by Corden (1994, p.90ff.): “Decentralised optimal decisions on private saving and investment will The Lawson-doctrine is epitomized by Corden (1994, p.90ff.): “Decentralised optimal decisions on private saving and investment will 
lead to a net balance— the current account— which will also be optimal. … It follows that an increase in a current account deficit 
that results from a shift in private sector behaviour … should not be a matter of concern at all. … �n the other hand, public sector 
behaviour… is a matter of public policy concern and the focus should be on this.” 
23 For a detailed critique of the Lawson-doctrine see Reisen (1998), pp. 11–14. For a detailed critique of the Lawson-doctrine see Reisen (1998), pp. 11–14.
critical values for crisis indicators is bound to be arbitrary, as theoretical foundations are lacking.24 In the absence 
of threshold values, including countries that did not suffer from crisis may be useful. The fiscal policies of the 
main crisis-affected countries reveal a startling fact: none of them ran a budget deficit. Instead, they recorded 
surpluses ranging from a modest 0.3% of GDP in the Philippines and Korea to more vigorous 2.7% in Thailand. 
Moreover, all the countries unaffected by the crisis show large deficits. Therefore, while it is tempting to rely on 
fiscal data, empirical evidence eliminates them as warning signals of balance-of-payments problems. Indeed, 
this diagnosis resonates with the recent recognition that simple rules of thumb such as the Lawson-doctrine do 
not offer a satisfying answer when it comes to assessing the sustainability of a country’s foreign debt or exposure 
to external crises.
A negative current account was a common feature of crisis-affected economies. It approached or clearly exceeded 
the 5% threshold suggested by the literature. The crisis began in Thailand, which had the highest deficit (7.9% 
of GDP). Nevertheless, similar deficits occurred in all control group countries except the PRC. Pakistan’s 7.2% 
deficit did not lead to any disastrous results. Clearly, in the case of the Asian crisis, current account deficits may 
have represented a necessary, yet by no means sufficient, conditionality.
The same is true for indicators constructed from various ratios of external debt or debt service. If anything, 
countries like Pakistan or India had higher debt burdens and thus should have been susceptible to crisis 
contagion. The only indicator substantially differing between the two country groups is the ratio of net short-term 
debt to foreign exchange reserves, which was above 100% in the case of Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, above 
most of the control group. Yet even this indicator was not completely accurate: Malaysia was not spared although 
its short-term debt ratio was relatively low. Pakistan, on the other hand, had a ratio of over 200% without being 
affected by the crisis.
Given these results, it would appear rather difficult to deduce warning signals from aggregate figures. Eventually, 
the amount of capital a country can and should acquire through international financial markets depends on its 
use over the long term, while in the short term contract characteristics do count—in the form of the currency 
and maturity structure. The only indicator that was moderately reliable was the ratio of short-term debt to official 
foreign exchange reserves.
2.2.2	 Beyond	rules	of	thumb:	Financial	sector	issues
As demonstrated, it is difficult to find reliable benchmarks for currency crises. The obvious bad performance of 
the intuitive indicators is mainly due to the fact that absolute or even relative levels of debt do not tell us anything 
about whether they are appropriate. In other words: Do additional resources inflate domestic consumption or 
do they promote higher investment? Further, can returns on investments be accurately assessed? The latter in 
particular is bound to complicate any assessment of sustainability. It points to the need of a more disaggregate 
approach. Therefore, this section tries to identify critical aspects connected with the meso and micro levels of 
capital allocation as represented by a country’s financial sector.
As outlined above, financial sector opacity prior to the Asian crisis has been broadly recognized. The previous 
section indicates the need to analyze aspects related to the maturity and currency structure of intermediaries’ 
portfolios—the  weight  of  short-term  debt  denominated  in  foreign  currency.  �n  the  one  hand,  the  negative 
impact of short-term capital tends to be understated, as accounting short-term debt is not perfect. For example, 
various types of implicit guarantees—that ensured immediate repayment if crisis-like developments occurred—
complemented many nominal long-term contracts.25 As the crisis began, massive liquidation of these instruments 
led to a downward spiral in asset prices and exchange rates. It is obvious that contracts implying conditional early 
repayment should be labelled short-term debt, not long-term.
24 Thus, Williamson (1999, p.2) suggests that total foreign debt should not exceed 40% of GNP and 200% of exports, while debt service 
should stay below 25% of exports. Nevertheless, he concedes that these critical values merely constitute “ru�e� �f �humb” without 
“����y����� f�u�d�����.”
25  See, for example, Islam (2000).  See, for example, Islam (2000).
While the problem of short-term debt resulting from implicit repayment guarantees may be easily remedied at 
least in theory, there is another, more complicated aspect to consider—the wave of innovative financial derivatives 
developed over the past several decades. �ffering substantial risk reduction, particularly in the context of cross-
border transactions, derivatives generally helped increase both gross and net capital flows. While enhanced risk 
management shows great progress in the field of financial engineering, there are some more sinister aspects 
connected with these instruments. Not only do they tend to amplify the variability of asset prices and exchange-
rates, but they can also be identified as the very cause of currency crises.26
Basically, there are two mechanisms at work. First, due to their off-balance-sheet position, derivatives may 
frustrate attempts by regulatory authorities to gauge financial risks using the ratio of short-term foreign debt to 
foreign reserves as a proxy. Second, there are deliberate attempts to destabilise a country’s financial equilibrium 
- currency speculation. In short, a speculator sells the currency to be attacked through forward contracts to a 
financial intermediary at a relatively long maturity.27 At this point, the bank’s balance sheet will be subject to 
a currency mismatch: It is long in local currency and short in foreign currency. To alleviate the problem, the 
bank will first sell local currency on the spot market and then make a foreign exchange swap to eliminate the 
resulting maturity mismatch. In a fixed exchange-rate regime, these spot market transactions compromise the 
official parity. Consequently, the central bank will have to intervene in the spot market, drawing down and if 
unchecked, eventually exhausting its foreign-exchange reserves.28 If and when the central bank loses the fight 
for the exchange-rate parity, speculators will be able to repay debt denominated in the target currency at much 
less expense.
The above argument indicates another problem aside from the difficulty of finding appropriate benchmarks. 
Well beyond the deplorable, yet unavoidable events in a less than certain world, currency crises are caused 
by the use—even the deliberate misuse—of financial innovations such as derivatives, theoretically designed to 
hedge risk. Implicitly, the initial search for warning signals surmised that, because crises create a net welfare 
loss, investors should be expected to shun irresponsible investments once signs of an eminent crisis appear on 
the capital market horizon. The question remains how private investors best use information provided by either 
the market or government, or even whether their interests aim to maximize social welfare at all. In short, were 
investors really caught by surprise when capital flows started to reverse at the end of the last decade?
An  interpretation  based  on  capital  market  efficiency  would  considerably  simplify  things,  but  it  does  seem 
somewhat naïve. Rather, there are at least two reasons explaining why foreign inflows of short-term capital 
continued despite the potential for crisis, or even because of it. First, the very characteristics of the inflows—the 
term structure—created the illusion that investors would be able to repatriate resources once the trouble began.29 
The fact that market participants significantly underestimated the individual repayment risk represents a typical 
fallacy of composition. While an individual investor may be able to avoid losses by withdrawing resources—
given that the rest of world remains passive—things of course look very different once everyone jumps on the 
bandwagon. Second, foreign investors do not bear the totality of risk created by their investment behavior. As a 
crisis starts to unfold, it is not solely the capital market that faces turmoil, but rather the economic system as a 
whole, including such vital components as real growth and employment.30
Thus,  from  an  aggregate  perspective,  excessive  risk-taking,  financial  myopia,  and  deliberate  speculation 
displayed by investors clearly represent a negative externality: economic theory suggests that the latter should 
be internalized to improve social welfare. To do so, policymakers may employ other instruments, such as taxes 
or quotas. The advantages and drawbacks of each of these instruments in the context of ensuring capital market 
stability are discussed in the following section.
26 For applications, see Steinherr (2000). For applications, see Steinherr (2000).
27 Buying put options on the target currency has the same destabilizing effect. For a much more detailed analysis of the role of derivatives Buying put options on the target currency has the same destabilizing effect. For a much more detailed analysis of the role of derivatives 
in the context of currency speculation, see Garber (1998) and Steinherr (2000).
28 Alternatively, it may issue a forward contract compensating the initial transaction. Yet even in this case, the central bank will be forced Alternatively, it may issue a forward contract compensating the initial transaction. Yet even in this case, the central bank will be forced 
to provide local currency credit.
29 Eichengreen and Rose (1998) argue along this line, even establishing a negative link between the prevalence of short-term capital and Eichengreen and Rose (1998) argue along this line, even establishing a negative link between the prevalence of short-term capital and 
banking crises.
30 This argument is highlighted by the thorough analysis of Furman and Stiglitz (1998, pp. 53–56). This argument is highlighted by the thorough analysis of Furman and Stiglitz (1998, pp. 53–56).
3.	 	 Financial	sector	regulation	and	capital	controls—managing	international	capital	flows	in	
ASEAN	
As already argued, measures aimed at prudential regulation of financial markets and traditional capital controls 
can be considered to some extent as two sides of the same coin. Both serve to influence the magnitude and 
composition of capital flows, and there is evidence of synergies between the two in an elaborate system of capital 
flow management. This point is made forcefully by Epstein, Grabel, and Jomo (2004), who offer seven country 
studies where they describe the capital management techniques employed, analyze their interplay, and assess 
their success in terms of achieving policy aims.
The approach taken here differs somewhat. As a detailed qualitative analysis of all ASEAN+3 countries, their 
macroeconomic circumstances, and respective capital management techniques is beyond the scope of this study, 
we focus on certain central issues in financial sector regulation and capital control imposition that constitute a 
kind of best practice derived essentially from historical experience. However, it is clear from the onset that a one-
size-fit-all policy is not only utopian, but even undesirable.  Southeast Asian nations are at different levels of state 
and administrative capacity, have different visions of macroeconomic policy, strive for different developmental 
goals. While no country wants to run an excessive risk of becoming entangled in a new financial crisis, the paths 
to ensuring this while pursuing various other aims diverge substantially. This paper can only hope to elucidate 
a number of general issues and provide some suggestions as to the benefits of increased regional cooperation, 
drawing on the experience in Europe and Latin America.
3.1  Prudential	financial	sector	regulation
Improving financial sector regulation and supervision is probably the most prominent issue currently debated in 
mainstream economics in the context of capital flow management in emerging economies. There is a certain 
conviction among applied economists and in international institutions such as the IMF that liberalizing capital 
account transactions can benefit a country’s economic performance if a number of preconditions have been met. 
Prudential banking and financial sector regulation in general is on top of the list.
That said, the central problem—and one that fortunately is receiving increased recognition—is that recommending 
an adequate regulatory and supervisory system to minimize informational deficiencies in international financial 
market transactions is much easier than actually implementing the system. Notably, this is also true for countries. 
Rodrik (1998) cites the US Comptroller of the Currency as complaining that (at the time of writing) only four out 
of the 64 largest North American banks practiced state-of-the-art portfolio risk management, and that the criteria 
for loan provision were thus considerably more lax than expected.
The example highlights the basic predicament. Regulatory legislation is one thing, supervision and enforcement 
of existing regulations is quite another. Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick (2000) discuss various obstacles facing 
developing countries when implementing prudential regulatory frameworks. Likewise, in an IMF working paper 
dealing with the adoption of Basel II standards in international banking Chami, Khan, and Sharma, (2003) stress 
the  numerous  problems  facing  emerging  economies  trying  to  improve  financial  regulatory  and  supervisory 
standards. �ne crucial difficulty springs from the divergence between private and public sector remuneration in 
attracting personnel for supervisory agencies able to deal with complex financial issues. At a time when expertise 
for strengthening regulatory and supervisory agencies is especially needed, both papers bemoan the fact that it 
is increasingly difficult to retain specialists or recruit new ones.
�ther problems concern the structure of banking systems in many developing economies. In countries where 
banks are connected to—or even majority-owned by—large industrial corporations, political influence can lead 
to regulatory exemptions. Large state equity in financial intermediaries equally makes political interference in 
public administration more likely.31 Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick (2000) conclude that there are considerable 
difficulties
in applying the developed country model of regulation, which relies heavily on accurate financial information, highly 
skilled technicians and an impartial bureaucracy, in an environment characterised by weak accounting and legal 
frameworks, acute shortage of skilled personnel and pervasive political interference in public administration.
Calomiris (1997) offers market-based proposals for improved financial regulation, suggesting that banks could be 
required to finance a certain minimum of their assets with subordinated, uninsured debt, with the yield capped at a 
maximum rate above the risk-free market rate.32 To mobilize this debt, banks would have to convince international 
investors of the adequacy of the bank’s capital assets in securing the credit. Monitoring is thus transferred 
to market-based institutions and rendered less vulnerable to political influence, particularly in countries where 
regulatory independence is not yet assured. In the same context, enhancing bank disclosure requirements to the 
private sector could be a complementary option to achieve more market-based financial sector monitoring. Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2005), in a cross-country study covering 37 developed and developing countries, 
present evidence suggesting that “empowering private monitoring of banks by forcing banks to disclose accurate 
information to the private sector tends to lower the degree to which corruption of bank officials is an obstacle to 
firms raising external finance.”
However, the authors also conclude that any improvement more or less hinges on having sound legal institutions. 
This is in line with major skepticism about the potential benefits from market-based financial sector monitoring. 
The point can be made that even in developed countries, where reliability of accounting and auditing standards 
is relatively high—the occasional scandal notwithstanding—disclosure requirements have a limited capability in 
monitoring private sector banks. After all, as Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick (2000) argue, a central rationale for the 
very existence of financial intermediaries is that they can acquire and process reliable information about borrowers 
more efficiently, and transform the respective risks. If it were possible to make this information and concomitant 
risk assessments publicly available and verifiable at low cost, the raison d‘être for financial intermediation would 
largely disappear.
The problems of enforcement cited above thus essentially remains. Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick (2000) argue 
that government-controlled regulation and supervision must remain central, and that problems described should 
be tackled mainly by ensuring that unified regulatory and supervisory measures are
(i)  relatively straight-forward,
(ii)  preferably independent from other components of the regulatory framework, and
(iii) easily verifiable and enforceable.
There are several measures that fit this description rather well. Above all, entry requirements and capital adequacy 
in banking come to mind. In countries where financial sectors are less sophisticated, higher potential risks could 
be offset by introducing stricter legal standards. Licensing criteria should go beyond those established in Basel II 
in terms of minimum capital requirements and capital adequacy ratios. The same is true for standards involving 
professional expertise and integrity of bank owners and senior management. Furthermore, and particularly in 
countries without freely floating exchange rates, there is a clear case for restricting the amount of foreign currency 
exposure to a bank’s equity.33
31 Quintyn and Taylor (2003) stress the importance of political independence for regulatory and supervisory agencies in achieving financial Quintyn and Taylor (2003) stress the importance of political independence for regulatory and supervisory agencies in achieving financial 
sector stability.
32 Argentina introduced a similar requirement in 1996, see Calomiris (1997), p. 36. Argentina introduced a similar requirement in 1996, see Calomiris (1997), p. 36.
33 See Steinherr and Peree (1999). See Steinherr and Peree (1999).
3.2   Capital	controls
The link between prudential regulation and capital controls has been established. While a sound financial sector 
can be considered key to achieving greater efficiency in capital flow management, establishing prudential routines 
in turn is best done under favorable conditions (Epstein, Grabel, and Jomo, 2004). From a historical perspective, 
capital controls have proved a great help for ensuring relative financial stability. The following discussion focuses 
on three instruments which have drawn public attention: the Tobin tax on foreign exchange transactions, which 
taxes all balance-of-payments transactions but is levied more heavily on short-term capital flows; the 1990 
Chilean model of unilateral restrictions on capital inflows; and the September 1998 Malaysian imposition of 
restrictions on capital outflows. From this analysis, lessons can be drawn for the future use of capital controls to 
reduce vulnerability in the face of financial volatility and currency crises.
The Tobin tax
The idea of a tax on cross-border capital flows is by no means new. Nobel Laureate James Tobin proposed it 
in the 1970s drawing on the remark by John Maynard Keynes that a tax should be established “with a view of 
mitigating the predominance of speculation over enterprise”. It resurfaced in public debate in the mid-1990s 
after the Tequila-crisis and then again after the Asian crisis. The main argument is that if asset prices—and thus 
exchange-rates—change much faster than goods prices, crises can in principle be prevented by abolishing 
exchange-rates altogether. While Tobin perceived the introduction of a sort of world currency—echoing Keynes’ 
proposal of a bancor—to represent the first-best solution, he thought it highly unlikely. Instead, he advocated 
putting “sand in the wheels of international finance” by increasing transaction costs.34 A moderate, worldwide 
ad-valorem tax on foreign-exchange spot-market transactions was meant to serve this purpose. By definition, 
the tax burden would increase with the frequency of transactions carried out. In this way, it was hoped that short-
term investment—which requires a higher velocity of foreign exchange transactions over a given period—would 
be discouraged, whereas trade credit, FDI, and longer-term instruments in general, would be affected only 
marginally.35 
The Tobin tax concept has been criticized for several reasons. First, in the absence of significant exchange rate 
movements, the Tobin tax introduces a significant wedge between domestic and foreign returns. However, during 
periods of foreign-exchange market turmoil , the Tobin tax pales in comparison with periodic exchange rate 
gains/losses,36 disappointing the major motivation for introducing the Tobin tax—prevention of currency crises. 
Haberer (2003) shows that investors prefer to make longer-term transactions, so long as the expected exchange 
rate appreciation compensates for the tax burden. Thus, in the context of an expected gradual exchange-rate 
appreciation sustained by capital inflows, the tax burden will discourage most heavily short-term assets. If, by 
contrast, investors expect a large devaluation, the tax must be extremely high to prevent capital flight.37 A moderate 
tax rate even risks generating a perverse effect that penalizes long-term investment.38 Furthermore, Bird and 
Rajan (2000) stress that if transaction frequency is the central determinant of the tax rate, then simple round-trip 
transactions will not be hit as hard as hedging current account transactions (which require four ”trips”).
Besides these critiques of the very effectiveness of the concept, the feasibility of the Tobin tax has been doubted. 
�n one hand, a tax on spot-market transactions is clearly not enough. Rather, it has to be extended to include 
various forward derivatives, futures, swaps, and options in order to minimize evasion. This is not easily done as 
such transactions usually occur off-shore, beyond national jurisdiction. The problem of transaction displacement, 
however, is common to most capital control measures. Furthermore, the Tobin tax was conceived as a multilateral 
mechanism. Thus, were a country to introduce it unilaterally, there would be strong incentives for financial 
intermediaries to move offshore to avoid the loss of competitiveness resulting from the tax. Therefore, the Tobin 
tax, if applied by a single country, needs to be moderate.
34 The idea was elaborated by Tobin (1978). The idea was elaborated by Tobin (1978).
35 Besides influencing the maturity structure of external debt, the introduction of a Tobin tax was also advocated to increase monetary Besides influencing the maturity structure of external debt, the introduction of a Tobin tax was also advocated to increase monetary 
independence in general and to generate proceeds for development projects.
36 As was indeed the case in Dornbusch and Frankel (1987). As was indeed the case in Dornbusch and Frankel (1987).
37 see Williamson (1999). see Williamson (1999).
38 For detailed calculations, see Haberer (2003). For detailed calculations, see Haberer (2003).
The Chilean e���je
After the serious balance-of-payments problems of the late 1970s and 1980s, Chile opted for a system of 
extensive capital controls to enable more stable growth.39 Its aim was to reduce the share of short-term capital in 
external debt and thus reduce external vulnerability. Nevertheless, capital flows should not be stunted altogether. 
Steady, long-term capital flows were to be maintained. To achieve this, Chilean authorities introduced several 
measures in June 1990. At the heart was a mandatory unremunerated reserve requirement (URR), whereby a 
certain percentage of capital inflows had to be deposited in a non-interest bearing account at the Central Bank of 










where r* is the world interest rate on capital flows representing opportunity costs, α is the share of capital that has 
to be deposited, p is the number of months the deposit must be maintained, and k is the total number of months 
that capital remains in the country.40 The tax rate embodies two obvious properties important to understand the 
Chilean model’s success. First, as in the case with the Tobin tax, the lower the k (the maturity of the asset), the 
higher the tax rate. �f course, this is exactly what was intended: to deter short-term capital while encouraging 
long-term inflows. Second, while not negligible,41 the tax rate is adjustable via the parameter α (the required 
deposit ratio), and the parameter p (the number of months the deposit must be maintained). Indeed, this flexibility 
is needed to compensate for changes in r*, (the opportunity costs of the reserve requirement. The first half of 
the 1990s saw rather generous international financing conditions and surging capital flows to emerging markets. 
Consequently, the authorities initially chose a substantial 20% deposit share. This was further increased to 30% 
in May 1992, but was reduced to 10% in June 1996, and finally to zero when financing conditions became much 
tighter in September 1998. The tax flexibility, in addition to its transparency, allowed authorities to adapt changing 
conditions with a stroke of the pen. 
There are several other features worth mentioning in the context of the Chilean e���je. Two instruments in 
particular successfully countered evasion of the capital controls. Foreign direct investment had to stay in the 
country for at least a year. This foiled attempts at disguising portfolio flows as direct investment flows.  The 
reserve requirement applied to trade credits as well to close current account transaction loopholes.42 Thus, 
the capital controls were clearly asymmetric, as they discriminated between capital inflows and outflows as 
well as between different asset maturities. �utflows were gradually liberalized while authorities maintained and 
even temporarily reinforced controls on inflows. This asymmetric design focused on avoiding crises rather than 
stopping capital flight in the event of a crisis.
How should we judge the performance of the Chilean model? �verall, the central objectives were fulfilled. As 
intended, the share of short-term capital inflows declined substantially.43 Also, alimentation of capital inflows 
remained remarkably stable even when controls were most harsh. The share of FDI increased despite the tax. 
Indeed, some writers view these results as a reason for the perception of reduced external vulnerability by 
international investors.44 �f course, there is no doubt that there were negative side-effects. Recent research 
points to the unavoidable increase in transaction costs, a dampening effect on trade due to the current account 
restrictions, and the adverse financial effects faced by smaller firms by way of credit rationing.45 Nevertheless, 
macroeconomic gains clearly exceeded microeconomic costs. There was no contagion in Chile from either the 
Mexican Tequila crisis or the Asian crisis. The fact that capital controls were eventually abolished does not mean 
39  Colombia established capital controls similar to Chile’s.  Colombia established capital controls similar to Chile’s. 
40  For a detailed description of the implicit tax, see also Edwards (2000).  For a detailed description of the implicit tax, see also Edwards (2000). 
41  Edwards (2000) reports a 1997 average 80 basis point tax rate .  Edwards (2000) reports a 1997 average 80 basis point tax rate .
42  Furthermore, controls were extended to include American Deposit Receipts (ADR) in 1995, thus filling another loophole.  Furthermore, controls were extended to include American Deposit Receipts (ADR) in 1995, thus filling another loophole.
43  Bird and Rajan (2000) report a decline from 20% in 1990 to 5% in 1998.  Bird and Rajan (2000) report a decline from 20% in 1990 to 5% in 1998.
44  See Bird and Rajan (2000).  See Bird and Rajan (2000).
45  For an overview of both microeconomic and macroeconomic effects, see Cowan and De Gregorio (2005). Gallego and Hern�ndez  For an overview of both microeconomic and macroeconomic effects, see Cowan and De Gregorio (2005). Gallego and Hern�ndez 
(2003), and Forbes (2004) for credit rationing of SMEs.
they were a failure. To the contrary, they provided a needed window of opportunity to bring about substantial 
financial sector reform in a stable environment. �nce these reforms became institutionalized, maintaining tight 
capital controls became superfluous. In sum, the Chilean e���je is an example of a set of capital controls 
successfully applied and—under appropriate circumstances—offers a valuable policy option for other emerging 
market economies about to embrace financial sector reforms.
Malaysia’s reaction to the Asian crisis
Unlike other countries affected by the Asian crisis, Malaysia rejected IMF proposals for emergency stabilization 
polices and instead opted for a package that included exchange controls and controls restricting capital outflow. 
The exchange controls—prohibiting transfers from ringgit deposits offshore and requiring rapid repatriation of 
export proceeds—were aimed at stabilizing the ringgit. Restricting capital outflow was simply to prevent capital 
flight. Authorities  applied  a  12-month  waiting  period  for  repatriating  capital  investments,  complemented  by 
a system of exit taxes levied on capital outflows—the tax was inversely proportional to the duration of stay. 
Together, the aim of the controls was to allow macroeconomic policies to reflate the economy—for example, 
maintaining lower interest rates than in the rest of the region would have been impossible without restricting 
capital outflows— defend the ringgit, and rebuild foreign exchange reserves.46
Shortly after the recovery began, restrictions on capital outflows were lifted. Exchange controls remained through 
July 2005. largely to prevent the re-emergence of an offshore ringgit market that could be used to speculate 
against the ringgit.
�bservers remain divided over whether the Malaysian approach to the financial crisis worked,. Some, such 
as Kaplan and Rodrik (2002), claim that the controls helped Malaysia escape the crisis relatively unscathed. 
�pponents argue that other parts of the region showed a more pronounced recovery. While it is virtually impossible 
conclude definitively on questions of counterfactual history, Malaysia proved that restrictions on capital outflows 
can work and do not produce the catastrophic outcomes many observers predicted.47 Thus, at the very least they 
can be considered a viable alternative to the emergency stabilization policies advocated by the IMF during the 
crisis—which were undoubtedly a safe recipe for severe recession.
The best strategy is, of course, to avoid emergencies altogether. Thus, long-term capital management—the 
Chilean e���je—appears preferable to ad-hoc measures in the hour of need. We discuss additional measures 
that might complement these policy options below. 
3.3		 Regional	cooperation
We argue that capital controls can be quite useful for curtailing short-term capital flows and reducing external 
vulnerabilities. In the absence of effective international cooperation, regulatory authorities must rely on instruments 
of control unilaterally: The Chilean e���je is a good example of a workable and effective application of capital 
controls. Nevertheless, some multilateral initiatives can contribute greatly to both promoting financial sector 
reform in individual countries and paving the way for future regional integration. While they do not include outright 
capital controls, they use of a number of different approaches to avoid crisis-like vulnerabilities. Indeed, several 
initiatives have already been introduced in Southeast Asia following the 1997/98 crisis:48
•	 �ur arguments stress that reliable information and benchmarks are essential, even if uncertainty 
can never be wiped out completely. �f course, this is, not merely true at the national level. Cross-border 
capital flows and potential contagion effects in times of crisis call for a transnational exchange of relevant 
data. The ongoing development of various information networks in Southeast Asia is a good example.49
46 For a detailed discussion of Malaysia’s crisis management and experience, see Jomo (2001). For a detailed discussion of Malaysia’s crisis management and experience, see Jomo (2001).
47 By late 1999, international rating agencies had upgraded Malaysia’s credit rating . In May 2000, Morgan Stanley’s Capital International By late 1999, international rating agencies had upgraded Malaysia’s credit rating . In May 2000, Morgan Stanley’s Capital International 
indexes reinserted Malaysia (Epstein, Grabel, and Jomo 2004).
48 For a more detailed survey see Sakakibara and Yamakawa (2004). For a more detailed survey see Sakakibara and Yamakawa (2004).
49 Formal economic reviews and policy dialogues have been established in the region, along with ASEAN+3 Research Group. Formal economic reviews and policy dialogues have been established in the region, along with ASEAN+3 Research Group.0
•	 As  mentioned  earlier,  speculative  selling  of  assets  denominated  in  domestic  currencies  can 
build detrimental or even debilitating momentum. In principle, this can be countered by central bank 
intervention as long as foreign-exchange reserves are available. Regional cooperation can bolster this 
reserve arsenal in different ways. Mutual assistance was provided by the Asian Swap Agreement (ASA) 
since 1977. In the past, these funds proved insufficient. Therefore, in the context of the Chiang Mai 
initiative of 2000, an intergovernmental conference agreed to expand available resources. Beyond the 
multilateral ASA, 16 Bilateral Swap Agreements (BSAs) are now in place worth more than $36 billion. The 
next logical step would be the creation of a common reserve pool placed under the authority of, say, an 
Asian reserve bank.
•	 The development of an Asian bond market has accelerated over the past decade. �ne significant 
step was the creation of the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) on the initiative of the Executives' Meeting of East 
Asia Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP). While the $1 billion in ABF1 assets were to build a basket of US 
dollar-denominated bonds issued by Asian sovereign and quasi-sovereign issuers, ABF2 focuses on 
establishing a market for assets denominated in local currencies. ABF2 consists of two components, 
a Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF) and a Fund of Bond Funds (FoBF) a two-tiered structure with a 
parent fund investing in eight Single-market Funds, which in turn invest in local-currency sovereign and 
quasi-sovereign issues. At some point in the future, this could lead to the development of tradable Asian 
currency units (ACU). These innovations are important steps toward building a regional environment 
with better and safer fundamentals—with the means to better prevent or effectively manage any future 
financial crisis.
In the past, both the US and the IMF criticised the introduction of similar measures. They suspect bolstering 
foreign-exchange reserves could generate moral-hazard effects. Sceptics stress that double-standards might 
emerge. Yet, the fear that IMF leadership might be compromised obviously weighs most heavily on the minds 
of many skeptics. skeptics. .50 While the establishment of regional institutions may indeed render IMF support obsolete, 
this should be seen as a positive development. �verall, the measures described above represent an important 
contribution to reduced external vulnerability in East Asia and can be expected to further the goal of deepening 
regional integration over the longer run.
3.4	Creating	an	Asian	Currency	Unit	(ACU):	an	opportunity	for	progressive	liberalization
The future creation of a regional currency, the ACU, provides an historic opportunity for progressive capital 
control liberalization. In its initial stage, an ACU could provide a gauge of exchange rate stability and monetary 
policy cooperation. Later, an ACU could develop into a store of value—for the denomination of bonds and bank 
accounts, for example. Success naturally requires promoting the ACU by governments, central banks, and other 
official agencies across the region. �ne thing governments could do for the development of an ACU would be 
to exempt all ACU transactions from exchange controls. This would require that residents can purchase bonds 
denominated in ACU, are allowed to open bank accounts in ACU, and that foreign residents can purchase 
domestic bonds denominated in ACU. �bviously, this would only mark a major liberalization for economies with 
strict controls. It would also take time to create and build investor confidence in the necessary ACU instruments. 
�nly as a second step could controls be lifted on all foreign exchange transactions. 
The first question that arises is whether it is possible to discriminate in favor of one currency, which breaches 
the basic WT� principle of non-discrimination. But the fact is that an ACU will start off as a special currency—
neither official tender nor foreign exchange. And will be special because each regional currency will be part 
of the basket definition. The European experience with its basket currency, the ECU, is instructive. Several 
European countries awarded preferential treatment to the ECU. For example, Belgium operated a two-tier 
exchange market where current account transactions passed through the first tier with fixed exchange rates, 
while capital account transactions passed through the second-tier with flexible rates. The two-tier exchange 
market is a capital control mechanism, as inflows will give rise to exchange rate appreciation in the second-tier 
50 �ne might recall the 1997 Japanese proposal to create anAsian Monetary Fund, which was abandoned after fierce opposition from the �ne might recall the 1997 Japanese proposal to create an Asian Monetary Fund, which was abandoned after fierce opposition from the 
US and the IMF, cf. Lipscy (2003).
and gradually reduce incentives for inflows.51 Belgium decided that all ECU transactions, independent of the 
underlying purpose of the transaction, had the benefit of first-tier treatment. Similarly, Ireland suspended capital 
controls for ECU transactions while Italy exempted ECU securities from a tax on interest rate receipts on foreign 
currency instruments.
Several implications of liberalizing capital flows with respect to ACU transactions are noteworthy. First, one of the 
reasons for restricting inflows is that they may render domestic monetary controls difficult, and that in the case 
of precipitous outflows an exchange crisis could develop. But, as long as inflows remain denominated in ACU 
and not converted into national currency, the exchange rate remains unaffected. Countries with already stable 
fundamentals would not be affected very much. By contrast, a country with high and volatile inflation typically 
experiences a shift out of domestic currency into foreign currency, frequently the US dollar. Although not allowed 
in principle, when a certain level of parallel currency holdings exists, authorities are forced to acquiesce and 
tolerate the holdings. If residents can legally shift into ACU, then transaction costs will be lower and the flight 
from domestic currency will accelerate. But this should not be deemed negatively as it would lead to a desirable 
and necessary corrective action to the disequilibrium. Second, capital controls also prevent domestic savings 
from being invested abroad, keeping it available for domestic investments to develop the economy. With efficient 
domestic resource allocation, the risk of losing capital abroad is small and offers useful diversification, particularly 
for small economies. However, an investment in ACU is not necessarily a loss for the domestic economy if, for 
example, local investors buy bonds issued by domestic issuers for local investments. However, an investment in 
ACU would be lost to the domestic economy if local investors buy ACU bonds of foreign issuers investing abroad. 
Nonetheless, compared with US dollar investments, the advantage remains that the money remains invested 
within the region.
To successfully implement an ACU strategy, liberalizing ACU transactions is in fact unavoidable. ACU debt 
payments can in principle be carried out either directly in ACU or in the basket itself. For the latter option the 
purchase of component currencies must be possible—capital controls on such transactions would make basket 
delivery difficult or impossible. Furthermore, hedging ACU transactions must be allowed. For instance, a local 
bank that borrows in ACU must be able to make loans in ACU, buy ACU securities, or hedge with the basket. 
Developing an ACU without liberalizing capital controls on ACU transactions would be illogical and possibly 
counterproductive.
Finally, the successful development of ACU financial instruments would positively contribute to the correction of 
global imbalances. As argued by Eichengreen (2006), imbalances affect the region as a whole. Several countries 
in the region have large current account surpluses, and as the region is increasingly interconnected by regional 
trade flows—many are suppliers to the PRC and hold bilateral trade surpluses. Furthermore, as members of the 
region are also competitors on world markets, reduction of an ACU surplus in one country would increase the 
ACU surplus of other countries in the region. If governments in the region used the ACU for financing part of 
their fiscal deficits and central banks would purchase ACU securities instead of US Treasuries, then the value of 
the dollar would fall independently of any country with accumulated ACU reserves rather than dollar reserves. 
Also, Asian currencies would not appreciate against the euro. As current account transactions of the region are 
in surplus with the US, but less so with Europe, a general appreciation of Asian currencies is not necessary nor 
desirable global imbalances adjust.
To conclude, a general elimination of capital controls in ASEAN+3 is not necessary for making an ACU a success. 
However, it is necessary to liberalize flows in and out of ACU. This, in fact, provides the opportunity to limit 
liberalizing capital controls to ACU transactions. This is less risky and easier than general liberalization, and 
benefits each country and the region. 
51 For details, see Decaluwe and Steinherr (1976). For details, see Decaluwe and Steinherr (1976).
IV.	 	Conclusions
Several conclusions emerge from this paper:
1.  Some form of capital controls exist in most, but not all, economies in ASEAN+3. There are solid justifications 
for controls in general, particularly in countries where the domestic financial system is fragile and macroeconomic 
imbalances exist. Theory and empirical evidence demonstrate that financial crises occur more frequently in 
countries with an immature financial sectors and macroeconomic disequilibria, and without capital controls. Most 
of the time, crises result from the interplay of the exchange market and the financial market. Hence, countries 
would be well advised not to liberalize capital transactions hastily, before the two basic conditions—robustness 
of the macroeconomic situation and of the financial sector—are fulfilled.
2.  Capital controls exist in various forms. The most prevalent are administrative controls, where efficiency 
may be questioned. Experience in many economies suggests that controls create fewer distortions when they 
are administered by one rather than several institutions, and when they are simple, transparent, and responsive 
to changing market conditions. The ideal form of control is designed to have its greatest influence when problems 
arise but remains benign when things are working well. Typically, administrative controls are neither easily 
eliminated nor reignited. As was demonstrated during the Asian crisis, among others, the most volatile form 
of capital flows are short-term bank credits, followed by other forms of short-term capital flows. A tax on short-
term capital inflows, for example in Chile, has the advantage of being simple and transparent, targets the most 
problematic form of capital inflows, and can easily  be adjusted as the situation warrants.
3.  Because crises usually comprise twin problems—originating in the foreign exchange market and spilling 
over into the domestic financial market or vice versa— regulating the domestic financial market (which does not 
even qualify as capital controls) is best at preventing crises.  For example, a regulatory measure applied in many 
countries limits net foreign asset positions of banks to below equity. �f course this rule would not apply to equity 
holdings by foreigners so FDI and foreign purchases of domestic stock would not be restricted. Domestic firms 
would still be able to borrow in foreign currency, so long as they have matching (by amount and maturity) foreign 
assets or hedge the foreign exchange risk. 
4.  For countries with extensive administrative capital controls the recommendation is to liberalize prudently 
and slowly. For efficiency, complex administrative controls should be replaced with simple, transparent, and 
easily enforceable instruments such as a tax on short-term capital inflows and/or a restriction of net foreign 
liabilities.
5.  The eventual development of a tradable ACU would allow the partial liberalization of capital controls by 
eliminating all restrictions on ACU instruments. This would increase the transparency and clarity of the rules 
applying to ACU transactions and contribute to developing a regional market. It would be an historic opportunity 
to gradually advance economic integration by initially liberalizing ACU transactions, moving toward free cross-
border capital flows at a later stage.
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Appendix
An	Overview	of	Controls	of	Cross-Border	Capital	Flows	in	ASEAN+3 
This appendix presents a detailed description of the capitals control systems in ASEAN+3 countries. Information 
came from the IMF’s A��u�� Rep�r� �� Ex�h��ge Arr��geme��� ��d Ex�h��ge Re��r������� 200�﻽﻽ which presents 
the main features of exchange restrictions and capital transaction-related regulatory frameworks worldwide, by 
providing a standard set of common headings at the country level. 
Information in the publication has been processed mainly by constructing synoptic tables to compare administrative 
responsibilities and to emphasize similarities and differences among ASEAN+3 countries. 
Specific attention has been paid to the measures concerning inward and outward capital flows. �ther measures 
and restrictions more directly related to current account transactions have been left out. 
When a measure (controls or permissions) has been implemented by a country but no detailed information is 
available, tables present the notation “yes.” An empty cell connotes no information available. In any case, the text 
completes the information provided in each synoptic scheme.
A1.	 	Some	features	of	exchange	arrangement	systems
Ten  countries  have  currently  accepted Article  VIII,  Sections  2,  3,  and  4  obligations  under  IMF Articles  of 
Agreement. Among them, the last was Cambodia in 2002. At the same time, Lao PDR, Viet Nam, and Myanmar 
use transitional arrangements under Article IX, Section 2.
Date	of	acceptance	of	IMF’s	Article	VIII,	
Sections	2,3,	and	4
Japan 01 apr 1964
Singapore 09 nov 1968
Malaysia 11 nov 1968
Indonesia 07 may 1988
Korea, Rep. of 01 nov 1988
Thailand 04 may 1990
Philippines 08 sep 1995
Brunei Darusslam 10 oct 1995
China, People’s Rep. of 01 dec 1996
Cambodia 01 jan 2002
As for currencies, only four countries allow foreign currencies to be used for domestic transactions in addition to 
national currencies. Brunei Darussalam and Singapore, which agreed to a reciprocal circulation system for both 
national currencies, allow official tenders to be exchanged at par without charge or restriction. Moreover, Lao 
PDR and Cambodia allow for free circulation of US dollars for payments. Lao PDR also allows free use of Thai 
baht.
Almost all ASEAN+3  exchange rate systems are characterised by a “unitary approach,” that is, only one official 
exchange rate is set. Cambodia and Myanmar are the exceptions, both employing a dual exchange rate system, 
with an official exchange rate and one market-based. The market exchange rate in Myanmar is unofficial but 
tolerated.
Under the classification of the exchange systems provided by the IMF, Table A1 shows the current situation in 
the ASEAN+3 region as regards management of the exchange rate.
Table A1:  Exchange	rate	systems







Managed floating with 
no pre-announced 
path for the exchange 
rate
X X X X X X X
Source: A��u�� Rep�r� �� Ex�h��ge Arr��geme��� ��d Ex�h��ge Re��r������� 200�﻽﻽ IMF.
Most countries use a managed floating system where the monetary authority intervenes, either directly or not, 
to influence the exchange rate. Interventions are not automatic, they do not follow an officially announced target 
rate, or specifically selected indicators.
�nly PRC and Malaysia are classified as conventional pegged arrangements. As specified by the IMF in its report. 
In 2005, both countries moved toward a more flexible exchange rate regime, even if no official reclassification 
was made.
Finally, Japan, Korea, and Philippines have adopted an independent floating regime while, on the opposite side, 
only Brunei Darussalam presents a fixed exchange regime where the Brunei dollar is fully linked to the Singapore 
dollar. 
Forward	exchange	market
Three types of forward exchange markets correspond to three different stages of financial development and 
regulation. Indeed, no such market exists in Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar. An exception 
is Brunei Darussalam where, due to the currency agreement with Singapore, the Currency Interchangeability Act 
signed between the two national monetary authorities, hedging transactions by residents of Brunei Darussalam 
may be conducted in the market for Singapore dollar.
The situation in the remaining countries is presented in Table A2. Here two degrees of controls are noted.. Japan 
has a completely unrestricted forward market while in Korea and Singapore transactions are limited to banks 
for hedging purposes. For the other countries the situation is more complex. Different systems of controls apply, 
concerning the subjects allowed entering forward exchange contracts, the currency and maturity of transactions 
and the underlying contracts.
Moreover, among all countries, only the Philippines’ forward exchange market, under the Currency Rate Risk 
Protection Program, provides central bank intervention for hedging purposes of foreign exchange risk held by 
local companies.
No direct and specific intervention on exchange transactions by fiscal or monetary authorities is provided 
outside the country-specific currency management frameworks.0
Table A2:  Forward	exchange	markets





















































































(3 to 365 
days)
Source: A��u�� Rep�r� �� Ex�h��ge Arr��geme��� ��d Ex�h��ge Re��r������� 200�﻽﻽ IMF
A2.	Arrangements	for	international	payments	and	receipts
Prescription	on	currency	requirement
For official requirements for currencies selection and settlement systems, no information is available for Brunei 
Darussalam and Indonesia. Cambodia, Japan, and Singapore have not been included in Table A3 because 
they do not provide any prescription requirement.
Among remaining countries, Lao PDR, and Philippines stand out because, even if no official currency requirements 
apply, effective limitations are set by their central banks by providing and accepting a limited number of selected 
currencies for international reserves composition.
Table A3:  Rules	on	currency	requirements
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Source: A��u�� Rep�r� �� Ex�h��ge Arr��geme��� ��d Ex�h��ge Re��r������� 200�﻽﻽ IMF.
�nly  four  countries,  Lao  PDR,  Malaysia,  Philippines,  and  Viet  Nam  participate  in  an  operative  bilateral 
arrangements with one or more other countries.
Administration	of	exchange	controls
Responsibilities for exchange controls are shared among various national authorities and agencies in general, with 
noticeable differences from country to country (Table A4). While in Brunei Darussalam and Singapore no formal 
exchange controls exist, the central banks and monetary boards determine exchange controls and regulations in 
Cambodia, Malaysia, Philippines and Viet Nam. In the remaining countries, two or more authorities, ministries, 
or agencies share responsibilities following a functional or hierarchical approach.
Table A4:	 Institutions	in	charge	of	controls
Brunei 





SAFE responsible for 
forex administration, 




regulated by C�LT 
for S�Es and by BI 
for banks
M�F, METI and 
Bank of Japan, 













for the public 
sector. B�L’s B�L’s 










administered by the CBM 
under instructions from 
MFR. FECB headed 
by the Deputy Prime 
Minister allocates foreign 








on behalf of 






Source: A��u�� Rep�r� �� Ex�h��ge Arr��geme��� ��d Ex�h��ge Re��r������� 200�﻽﻽ IMF.
Controls	on	export	and	import	of	banknotes
Controls on cross-border transactions of banknotes refer to physical movement between countries. (It should be 
noted that, where not indicated otherwise, measures refer both to residents and nonresidents and indications of 
limits in US dollar-denominated amounts also refer to equivalent amounts in other currencies).
�nce again, Brunei Darussalam and Singapore may be considered separately as there are no controls on the 
export or import of banknotes (Table A5). Also, Japan may be considered as a special case because a declaration 
system to the Ministry of Finance via customs applies, but only for inward and outward transactions of amounts 
above ¥1 million, a much higher limit than those in other countries.
Cambodia and Korea only require a customs declaration for amounts exceeding fixed limits.. Remaining countries 
have more complex or restrictive systems where no exceptions on maximum amounts are permitted, and/or 
different treatment of imports and exports or domestic and foreign currency are set, or declaration to customs 
authorities is replaced with more binding approval procedures.
: 
Table A5:  Controls	on	cross-border	banknote	movements
On	exports On	imports
Domestic currency Foreign currency Domestic currency Foreign currency
Cambodia
Declaration to customs 
over $10,000
 Declaration to 
customs over $10,000. 
NBC’s prior notification 
required for banks
Declaration to customs 
over $10,000
Declaration to customs 
over $10,000
PRC
Persons may not take 
out more than 20,000 
renminbi
Limits on amounts and 
forms for R. Both for R 
and NR needlincenses 
from banks or SAFE 
depending on the 
amounts. 
Up to 20,000 renminbi Declaration to customs 
over US$5,000.
Indonesia
�ver Rp 100 mln, BI 
prior approval and 
declaration to customs 
required
�ver Rp 100 mln, BI 
prior approval and 
declaration to customs 
required
Korea
Declaration to customs 
over $10,000
Declaration to customs 
over $10,000. For NR 
B�K notification also 
required
Declaration to customs 
over $10,000
Declaration to customs 
over $10,000
Lao	PDR
�ver Kip 5 mln B�L’s 
authorization required
For R, over $2,000 
B�L’s approval and a 
customs declaration 
required. NR limited 
to previous imports. 
B�L’s approval for 
commercial banks
�ver Kip 5 mln B�L’s 
authorization required
Declaration to 
customs over $2,000. 
B�L’s approval for 
commercial banks
Malaysia
�ver RM 1,000 a 
person C�FE’s prior 
approval required
For R, over RM 10,000 
C�FE’s approval and 
a customs declaration 
required. NR limited to NR limited to 
previous imports.
Up to RM 1,000
Myanmar
Not allowed Foreign Exchange 
Certificates required 
for R
Not allowed Foreigners may bring 
in up to $2,000 without 
any declaration
Philippines
�ver P 10,000 BSP’s 
prior authorization 
required
Declaration to customs 
over US $10,000
�ver P 10,000 BSP’s 
prior authorization 
required
Declaration to customs 
over US $10,000
Thailand
Up to B 50,000. 
Towards Vietnam and 




declaration over D5 
mln
SBV’s permission 
over previous imports 
or $3,000. Specific 
provisions apply for 
certain transactions
For individuals, 





permission for Fis 
required

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Controls on capital market and money market instruments are presented in Tables A8 and A9. Brunei Darussalam, 
Japan, and Myanmar are not considered as no controls apply in Brunei Darussalam and Japan, while information 
is unavailable for Myanmar. Cambodia has no securities market, so there is no information to provide.
For equity purchases by nonresidents, there are different degrees of controls. No limits apply in Indonesia while 
restrictions in the Philippines—mainly registration requirements—depend on who is involved in the transaction. In 
Thailand and Viet Nam, more binding limits apply via percentage limits on foreign investor domestic shareholdings. 
PRC system of controls contain both limitations on who can invest (only “qualified foreign institutional investors” 
may buy “A” shares) and limits on the amount of holdings.
Local selling or issuing activities by nonresidents also present interesting features. Singapore has the most 
liberal system, with no issuing restrictions. At the other extreme, issuing by nonresidents is prohibited in Viet 
Nam. In PRC, Indonesia, and Korea, there are a range of limitations based on the kind of instrument or on the 
foreign providers, or approvals are required. In Thailand, the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Thailand and the 
Security Exchange Commission set regulations. 
Conditions for residents’ purchase abroad of shares or similar securities also vary among countries. General 
controls on amounts and origin of funds financing the transaction apply in some countries. Central bank or 
national authority prior approval is required in others, while in Viet Nam these transactions are not allowed.
Finally, controls on shares or other securities with ownership rights, sold or issued abroad by residents, vary from 
limits on amounts depending on the listing market (Indonesia), approval requirements related to the nature of the 
shares (Malaysia), or fall under the general regulatory framework (Thailand).
Similar  comparisons  may  be  made  referring  to  bonds  and  debt  securities  markets.  For  local  purchase  of 
instruments by nonresidents, limitations mainly apply on the basis of investors and instruments purchased.
Nonresidents may not sell or issue bonds, or other debt securities in the domestic market in PRC and Viet Nam. 
In general, for other countries, approval requirements are set and, once again, the system prevailing in Viet Nam 
is more complex, with three authorities involved in the approving process.
The PRC control system for the purchase, sale, or issuance abroad of debt securities by residents is similarly 
complex. Different authorities share responsibility for authorization of domestic purchasers. Moreover, in the 
PRC, as well as in the Philippines, resident transactions may not be financed with foreign exchange provided by 
the domestic banking system. It is not allowed in Viet Nam. For sale or issuance of debt instruments abroad by 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The main features of controls on money market instruments and collective investment securities are presented in 
Table A9. (Singapore is not included as information is unavailable). Transactions conducted locally by nonresident 
operators are not allowed in PRC. This clearly shows an asymmetrical approach by national regulatory authorities. 
At the same time, sale or issue abroad by residents of money market instruments are prohibited in Viet Nam.
Moreover, one of the most interesting aspects provided by comparison among countries is the complexity linked 
to the number of national authorities involved in control systems. Indeed, where different authorities do not 
intervene, as in PRC and Thailand, a functional sharing of responsibilities takes place depending on the origin of 
the investors and the place of transaction. This is also true in Korea.
Controls	on	derivatives	and	other	instruments
These instruments are negotiable instruments outside the previous headings (Table A10). They are represented 
by a wide range of different transactions.
No controls on derivatives apply in Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Japan, and Singapore, so these countries are 
not included in the table. For Myanmar information is unavailable.
For  the  four  countries  where  detailed  information  is  available,  there  are  different  degrees  of  controls  on 
transactions  by  residents  or  nonresidents.  While  controls  in  PRC  discriminate  more  “against”  nonresident-
promoted operations, the regulatory framework in Malaysia seems slightly more in favor of them.
Regarding the other countries, the most interesting aspect is, on one hand, the prohibition of such transactions 
in Indonesia (if these are not associated with foreign exchange and interest rates) and, on the other hand, the 
general provision of no controls in Korea (where transactions are conducted through domestic foreign exchange 
banks). In general, approval requirements widely apply.
Controls	on	credit	operations
Various authorities in each country intervene depending mainly on the direction of capital flows—by residents 
to nonresidents or vice versa (Table A11). There are no controls in Brunei Darussalam and Japan. Cambodia, 
Myanmar, and Singapore are not included as no detailed information is available. In Cambodia, loans and 
borrowing contracts between residents and nonresidents are free, provided they are done through authorized 
intermediaries.
In PRC and Korea, two different authorities are responsible for controlling transactions (the CBRC and the SAFE 
in PRC) and for approvals (B�K and M�F in Korea). Also, two different authorities are involved in Viet Nam for 
guaranteeing borrowing abroad by residents from nonresidents (the central bank  for credit institutions and the 
Ministry of Finance for enterprises). A more liberal framework applies in the Philippines for both commercial and 
financial credits, where no controls apply provided that foreign exchange used in the transactions does not come 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A12 presents information on controls on both outward and inward direct investments and on requirements 
and restrictions on their liquidation. Neither Japan nor Singapore are included because in Japan, restrictions 
only apply to a limited number of industries (defence) and through prior notification, both for inward and outward 
investments. Singapore has no controls,
For outward direct investments, no restrictions on capital transfers apply in Cambodia, where they are only 
subject to prior declaration for amounts exceeding a specified limit. Almost all other countries require prior 
central bank or ministerial approval. In general, controls apply on the source of foreign funds. Viet Nam requires 
permission from the Ministry of Planning and Investment and enterprises must open compulsory accounts with 
the central bank for making transactions.
For inward direct investments, the main feature is the existence of specific restrictions by sector. These vary and 
can be based on negative or positive lists. No foreign exchange controls apply for Cambodia and Thailand. In 
Cambodia, approval from the Council for Development of Cambodia is required. In Thailand strict controls apply 
on related proceeds. Central or provincial authorities may be responsible for controls in Viet Nam, depending on 
the amounts involved.
There are no controls on liquidation of direct investments in Brunei Darussalam, Korea, and Philippines and, 
in general, there are no restrictions on repatriation of proceeds. The only exceptions are in Cambodia, where 
proceeds may be repatriated through authorized intermediaries (which report to the central bank over specified 
amounts), PRC, where prior consent from the original approval department and a verification by SAFE on use of 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Tables A13a—A13d and Table A14 show the main features of regulations specifically concerning commercial 
banks and credit institutions. Countries where detailed information is unavailable or no specific provisions exist 
are not included. The tables are self-explanatory.
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m
e
�
�
�
Y
e
s
R
e
s
e
r
v
e
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
o
n
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
-
d
e
n
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
b
e
e
n
 
u
n
i
fi
e
d
 
a
t
 
3
%
.
3
%
 
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
.
 
R
e
s
e
r
v
e
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
n
g
e
 
o
f
 
5
%
 
t
o
 
8
%
 
f
o
r
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
r
u
p
i
a
h
.
N
o
t
 
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
 
t
o
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
N
o
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
 
o
f
 
A
C
U
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
a
c
c
e
p
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
b
a
n
k
s
.
4
%
 
(
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
)
 
a
n
d
 
2
%
 
(
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
)
 
f
o
r
 
m
a
t
u
r
i
t
y
 
u
p
 
t
o
 
1
2
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
.
 
1
%
1
%
 
(
u
n
i
fi
e
d
)
 
f
o
r
 
m
a
t
u
r
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
1
2
 
t
o
 
2
4
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
L
�
q
u
�
d
 
�
�
�
e
�
�
 
r
e
q
u
�
r
e
m
e
�
�
�
Y
e
s
T
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
a
l
l
 
l
i
q
u
i
d
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
t
o
 
a
l
l
 
l
i
q
u
i
d
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
m
a
y
 
n
o
t
 
b
e
 
l
e
s
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
6
0
%
.
F
o
r
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
o
r
y
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
 
t
i
m
e
s
 
a
 
1
0
0
%
 
a
s
s
e
t
 
c
o
v
e
r
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
N
o
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
 
o
f
 
A
C
U
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
a
c
c
e
p
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
b
a
n
k
s
.
 
I
�
�
e
r
e
�
�
 
r
�
�
e
 
�
�
�
�
r
�
�
�
S
B
V
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
i
c
a
l
l
y
 
s
e
t
s
 
a
 
b
a
s
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
o
s
c
i
l
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
m
a
r
g
i
n
 
f
o
r
 
C
I
s
’
 
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
r
a
t
e
s
�
r
e
d
�
�
 
�
�
�
�
r
�
�
�
 
B
a
n
k
s
 
m
u
s
t
 
m
a
i
n
t
a
i
n
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
 
t
i
m
e
s
 
a
 
m
a
x
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
2
0
%
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
e
x
p
o
s
u
r
e
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
e
a
c
h
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
b
e
n
e
fi
c
i
a
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
n
e
t
 
w
o
r
t
h
.
T
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
a
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
b
o
r
r
o
w
e
r
 
t
o
 
a
 
b
a
n
k
’
s
 
n
e
t
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
m
a
y
 
n
o
t
 
e
x
c
e
e
d
 
1
0
%
.
 
 
 
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
A
�
�
u
�
�
 
R
e
p
�
r
�
 
�
�
 
E
x
�
h
�
�
g
e
 
A
r
r
�
�
g
e
m
e
�
�
�
 
�
�
d
 
E
x
�
h
�
�
g
e
 
R
e
�
�
r
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
 
2
0
0
�
﻽﻽
 
I
M
F
.

T
a
b
l
e
 
A
1
3
c
:
	
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
	
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
	
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
C
a
m
b
o
d
i
a
P
R
C
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
K
o
r
e
a
M
a
l
a
y
s
i
a
P
h
i
l
i
p
p
i
n
e
s
T
h
a
i
l
a
n
d
A
b
r
�
�
d
 
b
y
 
b
�
�
k
�
Y
e
s
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
e
q
u
i
t
i
e
s
 
o
n
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
b
y
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
i
s
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
q
u
a
r
t
e
r
l
y
 
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
P
B
C
B
a
n
k
s
 
m
a
y
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
,
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
 
l
i
m
i
t
s
,
 
o
n
l
y
 
i
n
 
F
I
s
,
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
e
 
i
n
 
fi
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
.
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
a
b
r
o
a
d
 
b
y
 
A
D
s
 
a
n
d
 
a
p
p
r
o
v
e
d
 
m
e
r
c
h
a
n
t
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
n
e
t
 
o
p
e
n
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
l
i
m
i
t
s
P
r
i
o
r
 
B
S
P
 
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
m
o
n
g
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
i
e
s
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
 
t
o
 
b
u
y
 
o
r
 
h
o
l
d
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
i
n
 
a
 
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
 
(
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
)
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
I
�
 
b
�
�
k
�
 
b
y
 
�
�
�
r
e
�
�
d
e
�
�
�
Y
e
s
P
B
C
 
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
E
q
u
i
t
y
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
i
n
 
a
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
b
a
n
k
 
c
a
n
 
r
e
a
c
h
 
9
9
%
.
F
S
C
’
s
 
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
N
R
 
t
o
 
a
c
q
u
i
r
e
 
o
v
e
r
 
1
0
%
 
o
f
 
s
t
o
c
k
s
N
R
 
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
 
u
p
 
t
o
 
3
0
%
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
i
n
 
a
 
b
a
n
k
F
r
e
e
 
a
n
d
 
f
u
l
l
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
o
f
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
b
a
n
k
s
.
 
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
j
u
r
i
d
i
c
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
n
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 
4
0
%
.
 
B
a
n
k
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
r
e
 
m
a
j
o
r
i
t
y
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
o
w
n
e
d
 
m
a
y
 
n
o
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
t
h
a
n
 
3
0
%
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
.
L
i
m
i
t
s
 
t
o
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
s
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
T
h
a
i
 
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
b
a
n
k
s
.
 
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
 
o
n
 
a
 
c
a
s
e
-
b
y
-
c
a
s
e
 
b
a
s
i
s
.
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
A
�
�
u
�
�
 
R
e
p
�
r
�
 
�
�
 
E
x
�
h
�
�
g
e
 
A
r
r
�
�
g
e
m
e
�
�
�
 
�
�
d
 
E
x
�
h
�
�
g
e
 
R
e
�
�
r
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
 
2
0
0
�
﻽﻽
 
I
M
F
.

0T
a
b
l
e
 
A
1
3
d
:
	
	
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
	
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
	
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
	
i
n
	
b
a
n
k
s
 
C
a
m
b
o
d
i
a
P
R
C
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
K
o
r
e
a
L
a
o
	
P
D
R
M
a
l
a
y
s
i
a
P
h
i
l
i
p
p
i
n
e
s
S
i
n
g
a
p
o
r
e
T
h
a
i
l
a
n
d
V
i
e
t
	
N
a
m
�
p
e
n
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
l
i
m
i
t
s
B
a
n
k
s
 
m
u
s
t
 
n
o
t
 
e
x
c
e
e
d
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
s
h
o
r
t
 
o
r
 
l
o
n
g
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
a
n
y
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
b
y
 
m
o
r
e
 
t
h
a
n
 
5
%
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
 
a
l
l
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
i
e
s
 
b
y
 
m
o
r
e
 
t
h
a
n
 
1
5
%
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
n
e
t
 
w
o
r
t
h
F
o
r
 
F
i
s
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
o
w
n
 
b
e
h
a
l
f
 
l
i
m
i
t
 
i
s
 
2
0
%
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
A
 
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
2
0
%
 
o
f
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
o
n
-
 
a
n
d
 
o
f
f
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
s
h
e
e
t
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
o
n
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
s
h
e
e
t
 
n
e
t
 
o
p
e
n
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
b
a
n
k
s
.
 
3
0
%
 
i
f
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
r
i
s
k
 
h
a
s
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
p
u
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
T
h
e
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
n
e
t
 
o
p
e
n
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
(
s
h
o
r
t
-
h
a
n
d
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
)
 
o
f
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
2
0
%
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
m
o
n
t
h
.
 
B
a
n
k
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
n
e
t
 
o
p
e
n
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
l
i
m
i
t
7
0
%
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
v
e
r
 
m
u
s
t
 
b
e
 
m
a
i
n
t
a
i
n
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
 
2
,
5
%
2
,
5
%
 
l
i
m
i
t
s
 
o
n
 
b
a
n
k
’
s
 
l
o
n
g
 
f
o
r
e
x
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
N
o
 
l
i
m
i
t
s
 
b
u
t
 
t
h
e
 
M
A
S
 
r
e
v
i
e
w
s
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
 
o
f
 
b
a
n
k
s
.
F
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
(
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
)
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
i
t
s
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
f
u
n
d
 
u
p
 
t
o
 
1
5
%
 
o
r
 
$
5
 
m
l
n
 
(
u
p
 
t
o
 
2
0
%
 
o
r
 
$
1
0
 
m
l
n
)
3
0
%
 
f
o
r
 
a
l
l
 
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
s
e
d
 
b
a
n
k
s
.
 
S
o
m
e
 
e
x
e
m
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
b
y
 
S
B
V
 
a
r
e
 
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
.
 
O
�
 
r
e
�
�
d
e
�
�
�
 
�
�
�
e
�
�
 
�
�
d
 
�
�
�
b
�
�
�
�
�
e
�
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
L
i
m
i
t
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
n
e
t
 
o
p
e
n
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
b
l
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
o
 
s
e
l
l
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
r
p
l
u
s
 
o
r
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
 
t
h
e
 
s
h
o
r
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
t
e
r
b
a
n
k
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
d
a
y
.
 
 
 
Y
e
s
 
O
�
 
�
�
�
r
e
�
�
d
e
�
�
 
�
�
�
e
�
�
 
�
�
d
 
�
�
�
b
�
�
�
�
�
e
�
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
 
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
A
�
�
u
�
�
 
R
e
p
�
r
�
 
�
�
 
E
x
�
h
�
�
g
e
 
A
r
r
�
�
g
e
m
e
�
�
�
 
�
�
d
 
E
x
�
h
�
�
g
e
 
R
e
�
�
r
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
 
2
0
0
�
﻽﻽
 
I
M
F
.

T
a
b
l
e
 
A
1
4
:
	
P
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
	
s
p
e
c
i
fi
c
	
t
o
	
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
	
i
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
s
 
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
J
a
p
a
n
M
a
l
a
y
s
i
a
P
h
i
l
i
p
p
i
n
e
s
S
i
n
g
a
p
o
r
e
T
h
a
i
l
a
n
d
V
i
e
t
	
N
a
m
P
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
	
s
p
e
c
i
fi
c
	
t
o
	
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
	
i
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
s
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
n
 
m
u
t
u
a
l
 
f
u
n
d
s
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
t
 
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
 
t
o
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
 
a
b
r
o
a
d
.
 
S
o
m
e
S
o
m
e
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
p
p
l
i
e
s
 
T
h
e
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
i
n
g
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
a
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
n
g
 
n
a
t
u
r
e
 
a
p
p
l
y
 
R
i
s
k
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
p
p
l
y
 
 
L
i
m
i
t
s
 
(
m
a
x
.
)
 
o
n
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
i
s
s
u
e
d
 
b
y
 
n
o
n
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
s
 
 
A
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
t
 
l
i
m
i
t
s
.
 
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
t
 
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
 
t
o
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
 
o
r
 
h
o
l
d
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
L
i
m
i
t
s
 
(
m
a
x
.
)
 
o
n
 
p
o
r
t
f
o
l
i
o
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
e
d
 
a
b
r
o
a
d
L
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
 
e
x
c
e
e
d
i
n
g
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
d
u
p
 
t
o
 
1
0
%
 
o
f
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
.
3
0
%
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
i
n
g
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
-
d
e
n
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
;
 
2
0
%
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
 
f
u
n
d
s
 
f
o
r
 
P
o
s
t
 
�
f
fi
c
e
 
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
 
F
u
n
d
.
I
n
s
u
r
e
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
m
a
r
g
i
n
 
o
f
 
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
 
(
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
)
 
w
i
t
h
 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
e
d
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
B
S
P
 
p
r
i
o
r
 
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
g
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
o
u
t
w
a
r
d
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
 
b
y
 
R
 
o
v
e
r
 
U
S
$
6
 
m
l
n
.
 
U
p
 
t
o
 
t
h
i
s
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
B
S
P
 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
a
r
y
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
p
p
l
y
Y
e
s
S
u
b
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
B
�
T
 
t
o
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
 
i
n
 
d
e
b
t
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
N
o
t
 
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
L
i
m
i
t
s
 
(
m
i
n
.
)
 
o
n
 
p
o
r
t
f
o
l
i
o
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
e
d
 
l
o
c
a
l
l
y
 
 
C
�
F
E
 
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
 
f
o
r
 
E
P
F
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
s
p
e
c
i
fi
e
d
 
l
i
m
i
t
s
 
 
P
o
r
t
f
o
l
i
o
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
l
i
f
e
-
 
a
n
d
 
n
o
n
 
l
i
f
e
 
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
 
i
s
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
a
c
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
n
o
t
i
fi
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
M
�
C
.
 
C
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
m
a
t
c
h
i
n
g
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
n
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
/
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
 
Y
e
s
 
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
R
e
p
o
r
t
 
o
n
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
A
r
r
a
n
g
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
R
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
2
0
0
5
,
 
I
M
F
.
1
 
 
T
h
i
s
 
w
a
s
 
a
l
s
o
 
t
r
u
e
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
E
M
U
,
 
w
h
e
n
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
R
a
t
e
 
S
y
s
t
e
m
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
 
m
e
a
n
t
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
i
n
g
 
 
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
t
o
 
k
e
e
p
 
t
h
e
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
i
n
 
l
i
n
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
’
s
 
l
e
a
d
i
n
g
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
u
t
s
c
h
m
a
r
k
.
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